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Article 
Administration by Treasury 
David Zaring† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The Treasury Department pulled out all the stops during 
the beginning and middle of the financial crisis, and toward the 
end, when Congress got involved, its efforts got even more 
dramatic. First, Treasury engineered the sale of some financial 
intermediaries,1 seized two congressionally chartered corpora-
tions designed to encourage home lending,2 and issued death 
sentences against other financial institutions, including Leh-
man Brothers and Washington Mutual, by far the two largest 
 
†  Assistant Professor, Legal Studies Department, Wharton School of 
Business. Thanks to Robert Ahdieh, Cary Coglianese, Kristin Hickman, and 
participants in workshops at the annual meetings of Connecticut, Emory, 
Penn, and the Law & Society Association and Academy of Legal Studies in 
Business. Thanks also to Laura Kaufman and Justin Simard for research as-
sistance, and to the Zicklin Center at Wharton for research support. Copyright 
© 2010 by David Zaring. 
 1. See Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S. 
Seizes, Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 
18286005 (describing the circumstances surrounding Treasury’s engineering 
the sale of Washington Mutual to J.P. Morgan Chase for $1.9 billion); Megan 
Davies & Joseph Giannone, JPMorgan to Buy Bear Stearns for $2 a Share, 
REUTERS, Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN 
1671008920080317 (describing the takeover of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan as 
having “the backing” of the Treasury); Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold 
Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 26, 2008, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12223841 
5586576687.html (describing the sale of Washington Mutual); Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, In Sweeping Move, Fed Backs Buyout and Wall St. Loans, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 17, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 5189440 (describing the sale of 
Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan Chase as “done at the behest of the Fed and the 
Treasury Department”). 
 2. See Charles Duhigg et al., As Crisis Grew, a Few Options Shrank to 
One, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2009, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 17004722 (de-
scribing the Treasury takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); Rebecca 
Christie & Dawn Kopecki, Paulson Engineers U.S. Takeover of Fannie, Fred-
die, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=20601087&sid=ajcw4yxxPGJ8.  
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bank failures in American history.3 It did almost all of this, to 
the consternation of many observers, without review by the 
courts, the advice of Congress, or, it appears, the input of the 
rest of the executive branch.4 
Such radical administrative independence is not thought to 
be a feature of the modern administrative state. And sure 
enough, when Treasury’s dealmaking and nationalization ef-
forts failed to relieve the strains on the financial markets, the 
Federal Reserve Board, its partner in these deals, bailouts, and 
forced resolutions, urged the Department to seek guidance and 
money from Congress.5 Treasury agreed to do so.6  
But the congressional authorization that Treasury received 
underscored its unique position. The Department first proposed 
that Congress give it $700 billion to bail out Wall Street in a 
three-page document that did not provide for any supervision 
by the legislature or any judicial review by the courts or even 
 
 3. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was the largest bankruptcy in U.S. 
history. Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt, 
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman 
-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt; Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, 
Lehman Files Biggest Bankruptcy Case as Suitors Balk, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?sid=awh5hRyXkvs4& 
pid=20601087. Washington Mutual’s failure was the largest bank failure in 
U.S. history. Sidel et al., supra note 1; Ari Levy & Elizabeth Hester, WaMu 
Assets Sold to JPMorgan in Record Bank Failure, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 26, 
2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aVA8ErWOAjmI.  
 4. See Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 57 (2010) (using the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) as an example of the unconstitutionality of modern administrative 
law); Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46, 52–53 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/05/the-quiet 
-coup/7364/ (arguing that banks captured the policymaking process during the 
financial crisis and that the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve en-
gaged in “late-night, backroom dealing”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Melt-
down of 2008, at 11 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Economics 
Working Paper No. 440; Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Paper No. 244; Harvard Law Sch.: Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper 
Series, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 08-50; Harvard Law Sch.: 
Program on Risk Regulation Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-04, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301164 (stating that some of Treasury’s 
actions during the financial crisis were probably not legal).  
 5. See Joe Nocera & Edmund L. Andrews, Running a Step Behind as a 
Crisis Raged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 
20148298 (“‘Ben said, “Will you go to Congress with me?”’ said Mr. Paulson, 
referring to the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben S. Bernanke. ‘I said: “Fine, I’m 
your partner. I’ll go to Congress.”’”).  
 6. Id. 
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other parts of the executive branch.7 It also asked for near 
complete discretion regarding how to spend the money.8  
Congress essentially gave Treasury all the money and 
power that it sought.9 The bailout legislation did not result in 
any substantial judicial review of the Department, while the 
congressional oversight provided by the statute—the sort of 
oversight that does play a role in some of the other matters 
that Treasury handles—largely consisted of congressmen and 
blue ribbon commissioners waxing apoplectic while Treasury 
changed its mind, multiple times, about how to spend its newly 
gotten funds.10 
Nor was this legislative victory for Treasury’s discretion 
the only notable aspect of its role in the financial crisis. Before 
getting its generous flexibility from Congress, Treasury appar-
ently never consulted with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to 
ensure that the legislation met the usual constitutional and 
procedural standards, and was crafted in a way that considered 
the possible risk of litigation.11 It also did not ask the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to review the fiscal implica-
tions of such a massive bailout.12 Most bills proposed by the ex-
ecutive branch, of course, feature such reviews.13 
 
 7. See Steven Davidoff, The ‘Compromises’ in the Bailout Bill, DEALBOOK 
(Sept. 29, 2008, 10:15 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/the 
-compromises-in-the-bailout-bill/. 
 8. Treasury urged Congress to pass a law whereby “[d]ecisions by the 
Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act” should be “non-reviewable and 
committed to agency discretion,” and accordingly could “not be reviewed by 
any court of law or any administrative agency.” Text of Draft Proposal for Bai-
lout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, § 8, Sept. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/ 
business/21draftcnd.html (providing the text of the proposal). Nor was there 
any provision, at least initially, for reporting to Congress itself on how the 
money was spent. Id. 
 9. Davidoff, supra note 7. 
 10. See infra Part II (describing Treasury’s handling of the financial crisis). 
 11. See Nocera & Andrews, supra note 5 (characterizing the original bail-
out plan, which was drawn up by Treasury with little outside input, as “poorly 
conceived and unworkable”). 
 12. Neither, for that matter, did Congress itself or the Congressional 
Budget Office play much of a role in vetting the legislation. See David M. 
Herszenhorn, Bush Signs Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 
WLNR 18884174 (describing Congress taking two weeks to approve the $700 
billion bailout package); Lori Montgomery & Paul Kane, Bush Enacts Historic 
Financial Rescue; House Passes Plan by Wide Margin, but Stocks Keep Falling, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2008, at A01 (stating that Congress spent two weeks to 
approve the bill and emphasizing that the bill gave Treasury broad powers).  
 13. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the 
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1267 (2006) (describing the persis-
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The financial crisis was an extraordinary time for Trea-
sury, and perhaps extraordinary times are not the best times to 
assess the way an agency ordinarily does its job.14 But the in-
teresting thing about Treasury is that it usually operates in 
this fashion. In crises, it acts quickly, and—although not un-
constrained by law—interprets its legal authority flexibly and 
aggressively.15 In ordinary times, it acts in exactly the same 
way. It develops policy and makes rules without much atten-
tion to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).16 Treasury has 
created for itself an ambit of discretion beyond the reach of the 
judiciary, and only somewhat within the bounds of congres-
sional oversight.17 The financial crisis illustrated just how in-
dependent Treasury has become. But this independence is not 
new; it is characteristic. 
In fact, Treasury has marched to the beat of its own drum 
since the founding of the current administrative state in the af-
termath of World War II. Even then, for example, it did not call 
its regulations “regulations,” but instead called them “deci-
sions.”18 It also officially ignored the OMB, that exemplar of 
presidential oversight within the executive branch until the 
late 1980s (and may still be unofficially ignoring it, at least on 
occasion, today).19 Treasury has always used its administrative 
 
tence of OMB review of major regulations throughout presidential administra-
tions since President Reagan first established OMB).  
 14. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 23 (describing Congress’s 
delegation of broad powers to the Executive and the sweeping executive pro-
posals in times of crisis).  
 15. Id. at 14 (discussing the Treasury and the Fed’s “flexible reading of 
the 1932 law,” which they interpreted to give them the authority to bail out AIG). 
 16. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).  
 17. See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Ex-
amining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act 
Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007).  
 18. As Carl McFarland observed when the APA was being promulgated: 
[I]f you were a bright young law student walking down the corridor in 
your law school and saw a set of books labeled “Treasury Decisions” 
you would probably pass them by if you[ ] were looking for Treasury 
regulations, because the word “decisions” usually means determina-
tions in particular cases. But in the Treasury Department they call a 
general rule a “decision.” 
Carl McFarland, Analysis of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, in THE 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES 16, 19–20 (George Warren ed., 1947). 
 19. It was not subject to such review before the implementation of the 
administrative process encapsulated in the 1987 Paperwork Reduction Act, 
also unconventional for an agency. William F. Funk, The Paperwork Reduction 
Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 
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law judges differently—and less frequently—than do other 
agencies.20 And, in an odd complement to its regulation of fed-
erally chartered banks, it even operated its own bank, out of its 
ornate Cash Room, where government checks could be cashed, 
and Treasury securities bought and sold.21 Other agencies do 
not act so creatively; they act through rulemaking and adjudi-
cation, subject to review by the courts, notice-and-comment 
from the public,22 and supervision within the executive branch 
by OMB.23 And that is all they do. But Treasury is different.  
Its idiosyncrasies have a long history, too. As Jerry Ma-
shaw has shown, Treasury’s independence from judicial review 
(if not always from congressional oversight) stretches back to 
the earliest days of the republic, and its status as an agency es-
tablished long before the advent of post-war administrative 
procedure is critical for understanding why Treasury is so dif-
ferent.24 Thomas Jefferson’s Secretary of Treasury, Albert Gal-
 
37 (1987); see also Executive Office Appropriations Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-
500, § 101(m), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat. 1783) 309, 317 (excluding OMB 
review of regulations of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the 
Treasury Department); John V.N. Philip, Note, The Paperwork Reduction Act 
in United Steelworkers of America v. Pendergrass: Undue Restriction and Un-
realized Potential, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 923 (1989) (discussing how new 
procedures under the Act require previously exempt agencies to consult with 
the OMB). Even then, Treasury and the IRS disputed OMB’s oversight to the 
point of a within-the-executive-branch deployment of a legal process to force it 
to be more conciliatory. Memorandum Op. for the Counsel to the Vice Presi-
dent & Counsel to the Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 6 Op. O.L.C. 388, 388–
89 (1982); see also Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rule-
making, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 552–62 (1989) (suggesting that old-line 
cabinet departments such as State and Treasury had the clout to beat OMB 
when it came to a dispute). Moreover, OMB has since been told to tread care-
fully when working with Treasury to sort through tax expenditures. U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD/AIMD-94-122, TAX POLICY: TAX 
EXPENDITURES DESERVE MORE SCRUTINY 97 (1994). 
 20. See generally Ronald Cass, Allocation of Authority Within Administra-
tive Agencies: Theory and Empirical Analysis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1986) (de-
scribing the use of administrative law judges). 
 21. Indeed, it did so between the Civil War and the 1970s. See Guy Munsch, 
Restoring and Modernizing the U.S. Treasury Building: An Overview and Three 
Case Studies, 33 APT BULL.: J. PRESERVATION TECH. 23, 23–29 (2002). 
 22. See Hickman, supra note 17, at 1732–35 (describing the general rule-
making requirements for agencies imposed by the APA). 
 23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929, OMB’S ROLE IN 
REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE 
REVIEWS 7–8 (2003). 
 24. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Adminis-
trative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1666 
(2008) (explaining that during the Jacksonian era “much, if not most, over-
sight and control of .  .  .  administrative action originated within bureaus and 
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latin, for example, complained that Congress tried to give him 
too much power independent of the President—a complaint 
that resonates today in view of the power given Treasury to bail 
the banks out of the recent financial crisis.25 Then, as now, 
Treasury did not let its central mission prevent it from taking 
on other administrative tasks. It spearheaded, for example, 
some of the earliest efforts of the federal government to provide 
health insurance to its citizens by administering insurance 
programs for sick or injured merchant mariners.26 In short, 
Treasury developed its own way of performing its duties long 
before the modern administrative state took shape.27  
 
departments,” and that “Treasury regulated its relationships with state banks 
and with the sub-Treasuries by contract and circular, largely unaided (and oc-
casionally derailed) by congressional legislation”). 
 25. See MARY L. HINSDALE, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENT’S CABINET 44–
45 (1911). For further discussion, see Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 
and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & 
POL. 483, 486–88 (1988). See also Elizabeth Lee Thompson, Reconstructing the 
Practice: The Effects of Expanded Federal Judicial Power on Postbellum Law-
yers, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 306, 308–09 (1999) (describing Treasury’s control 
of all Southern commodities following the Civil War). 
 26. Gautham Roa, Sailors’ Health and National Wealth, COMMON-PLACE 
(Oct. 2008), http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/cp/vol-09/no-01/rao/. 
 27. Stephen Skowronek has observed, albeit in a very different context, 
that “[m]odern American state building successfully negotiated a break with 
an outmoded organization of state power. The modern American state 
represents an internal governmental reconstruction worked out through in-
cremental political reform.” STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW 
AMERICAN STATE 285 (1982). Treasury has been performing its own Skowro-
nekian mission a century after the administrative state he described was built. 
In that sense, Treasury’s incremental evolution into discretionary areas has, in 
the end, created an agency a sea change apart from ordinary administrative 
law. Of course, Skowronek found the development to push at the outer bounds 
of constitutionality: “The major constructive contribution of the New Deal to 
the operations of the new American state lay in the sheer expansion of bu-
reaucratic services and supports. . . . [T]he New Deal turned bureaucracy itself 
into the extraconstitutional machine so necessary for the continuous operation 
of the constitutional system.” Id. at 289. For more on this, see Gary Lawson, 
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 
(1994) (“The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its 
validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless consti-
tutional revolution.”). Others characterize the impetus behind the legislative 
announcement as nothing more than the usual sorts of battles between con-
servatives and liberals over policy choices. See, e.g., George B. Shepherd, 
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal 
Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1996) (arguing that the enactment was 
spurred by conservatives’ fear of overreaching by F.D.R.’s New Deal agencies 
and that only when the Supreme Court began refusing to strike down New Deal 
proposals in 1937 “did the reform proposals receive broad public interest”). 
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This Article analyzes the administrative law of Treasury 
and shows how it evades the ordinary constraints of the APA. 
The Department has found for itself an evolving mission that 
removes it from the traditional province of judicially supervised 
administrative procedure. At the same time, it enjoys a patina 
of expertise that has largely, though not always, insulated it 
from the hurly-burly of political supervision from Congress or 
the President. Sometimes it escapes its usual obligations by 
acting through contract, rather than regulation; it does deals 
akin to Secretary Henry Paulson’s deal during the last finan-
cial crisis.28 Sometimes Treasury avoids administrative proce-
dure because it is engaged in criminal-style law enforcement 
with only civil-style limitations on its investigative capabili-
ties—increasingly the case with the Department’s law enforce-
ment efforts, which include the pursuit of terrorists, narco-
traffickers, and tax cheats.29 Foreign relations with other im-
portant players and regulators in the global marketplace are 
also increasingly a part of Treasury’s remit, and those actions 
similarly take it out of the usual context of domestic checks on 
its powers.30 Each of these increasingly important parts of 
Treasury’s mission is subject to judicial deference for tradition-
al national security- and foreign relations-related reasons.31 
Those portions of Treasury’s oversight that do implicate 
regulated industry and judicial review often proceed on a prin-
ciples-and-examination basis that differs from traditional rules-
based administrative law. Moreover, financial regulation—
which standalone parts of Treasury do for both banks and 
thrifts—is simply less litigious than is the sort of regulated in-
dustry oversight that other important agencies, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), perform.32 Unlike the 
EPA, Treasury’s mission is aligned with the goals of the com-
panies it regulates, in that both the industry and the regulator 
aspire to ensure that financial institutions are “safe and 
 
 28. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Gov-
ernment’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 473–512 
(2009) (describing Treasury’s actions during the 2008 financial crisis as facili-
tating and making deals).  
 29. See infra Part I.C.3.b (describing Treasury’s expanded role in monitor-
ing criminals and tax evaders). 
 30. See infra Part I.C.2 (explaining how Treasury’s international opera-
tions evade many of the typical administrative constraints). 
 31. See supra notes 29–30. 
 32. See infra notes 60–67 and accompanying text (showing that Treasury 
is party to far fewer suits than other agencies). 
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sound,” or capitalized sufficiently to survive a reversal of for-
tunes.33 Underlying all this is the work that Treasury has al-
ways done—which is itself in the realm of nontraditional ad-
ministrative procedure—which is to raise money and dole it out 
to the rest of the federal government pursuant to Congress’s 
complex appropriations directions. 
If history, an evolving and discretion-oriented mission, and 
a principles-based and relatively collaborative approach to reg-
ulated industry are the facts that explain why Treasury’s ad-
ministration is different, then the normative implications and 
substantive relevance of the difference remain to be explored.  
The descriptive case for understanding how Treasury oper-
ates rests not just on its importance, but also on the fact that it 
is a particularly important example of an overlooked kind of 
government regulation. Moreover, although Treasury is less 
constrained by courts than are classic APA-regulated agencies, 
it is not alone in this capacity. Mashaw has shown in a series of 
articles that much of the action of the administrative state—
action that lawyers try to shape—has happened far away from 
the courts since the Republic’s earliest days.34  
In general, older agencies like the Departments of State 
and Defense do things differently, because, like Treasury, they 
had their own administrative procedures and customs in place 
before the post-war implementation of the APA regime.35 So do 
agencies that derive most of their authority from the funds they 
disburse, like block grant operators such as the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, and, to a lesser degree, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, which devotes 
most of its budget to funding Medicaid and Medicare, both di-
rectly and through the states.36 
 
 33. See infra Part I.C.1.a (describing bank regulation as a collaborative 
process). 
 34. See Mashaw, supra note 24, at 1669–84 (showing that American ad-
ministrative procedure was quite elaborate at the beginning of the Republic 
even though there was not yet a modern conception of judicial review); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1319–37 (2006) (describing the historical role 
of the courts and judicial review in administrative law).  
 35. The Department of the Treasury, Department of War, and Depart-
ment of State were established by Congress during George Washington’s ten-
ure as the first President of the United States. BRYON GIDDENS-WHITE, OUR 
GOVERNMENT: THE PRESIDENT AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 13 (2006).  
 36. Jacob Goldstein, Reminder: Medicare, Medicaid Are Gobbling Up the 
Budget, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 2, 2010, 8:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
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Is this quasi-independence a bad thing? Some have argued 
that the Treasury Department is a department run amok.37 But 
it may be worth viewing Treasury’s administrative law as use-
ful experimentation, with its own set of constraints, albeit lim-
ited ones, in the hope that a variety of forms of governance 
make for a better administrative state. To be sure, the way that 
Treasury regulates now is a particularly striking example of 
the lengths to which agencies will go to move beyond old con-
straints. Public choice theorists presume that agencies will al-
ways seek to broaden the scope of their authority.38 And al-
though, as Daryl Levinson has suggested, the jury is very much 
out on this question,39 it is certainly the case that Treasury has 
shifted away from supervised administration and toward dis-
cretion by shifting the locus of its activities toward emergen-
cies, law enforcement, and international affairs—areas on 
which it spent little time as recently as twenty years ago.40 It 
has turned its authority over banking, in crisis, into a remit to 
pursue or eschew all but unreviewable bailout-or-failure deci-
sions, and the like.41  
This record is not altogether praiseworthy, but it is, as a 
descriptive matter, tremendously understudied. Each of Treas-
ury’s various activities has developed into a legal ecosystem, 
with its own rules and regulations, with substantial effects on 
the economy, and especially on the industries and individuals 
subject to its oversight. Large private bars have evolved in the 
District of Columbia and elsewhere to manage the relationships 
 
health/2010/02/02/reminder-medicare-medicaid-are-gobbling-up-the-budget/; see 
infra notes 258–61 and accompanying text. 
 37. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 4, at 57–58. 
 38. See, e.g., David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the 
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99 (2000) (explaining that public choice 
analyses have often assumed that administrative agencies act with self-
interested motives).  
 39. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional 
Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 920 (2005) (arguing that government officials may 
not seek to aggrandize their agencies, as scholars have previously contended).  
 40. See, e.g., David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 92–95 (2009) (describing the evolution of a committee 
chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury from one with a cautious track record 
to one with broader involvement in foreign affairs). 
 41. And here, too, Treasury exemplifies a process known to other agencies, 
which on occasion have preferred to implement their mandates through informal 
advice and the development of best practices rather than through the sort of 
rulemaking likely to end up in the courts of appeals. For a description of this 
process, see generally David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006).  
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between Treasury’s regulators and its regulated.42 And yet, al-
most nothing about what these lawyers do is studied in law 
schools, or analyzed by legal scholars.  
To fill that void, this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I 
posits that Treasury has removed itself from typical adminis-
trative law and moved into a place that depends more on con-
gressional than on judicial oversight (although, on occasions, 
there is little of either). Using Treasury’s organizational chart 
to assess its operations, this Part shows how it has found a 
niche in the interstices of supervision where it plays a role in 
domestic rulemaking that is devised informally, in collabora-
tion with regulated industry, and often in coordination with its 
international counterparts. Before turning to the nuances of 
Treasury’s operation, however, Part I justifies that methodolog-
ical approach. A case study on one aspect of the financial cri-
sis—Treasury’s bailout of the multi-billion dollar money mar-
ket fund (MMF) industry—illustrates the difference between 
Treasury’s administrative law and ordinary administrative 
law. Part II offers that case study, and considers the marginal 
role that judicial review has played in the financial crisis, as an 
example of how the administrative structure essayed in Part I 
meshes with the typical administrative state. Part III assesses 
how Treasury’s administrative law might fit into a broader vi-
sion of agency action, one less constricted by the APA, and one 
that more comprehensively describes what the government—
and the lawyers who represent clients before it—do. Finally, 
this Article concludes by cautiously making the case in defense 
of Treasury’s dramatic administrative exceptionalism—a case 
that calls for better congressional oversight, perhaps, but not 
necessarily an expansion or revisitation of the basics of admin-
istrative governance. 
I.  HOW TREASURY WORKS   
This Part contends that Treasury practices a different form 
of administrative regulation than that usually studied by legal 
scholars. It points to two reasons for Treasury’s exceptionalism: 
a historical bent away from traditional administrative law, one 
that preceded the APA and was not much affected by it; and an 
evolution of its current activities into the interstices of regula-
tion by courts and even by other parts of the executive branch. 
This Part explores what Treasury does in some detail, for two 
 
 42. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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reasons. First, it does so because legal scholars have neglected 
these activities even as vigorous legal bars have grown to ad-
dress them. Second, an account of the work that Treasury does 
in ordinary times makes it possible to understand its actions 
during extraordinary times, such as the recent financial crisis, 
which is addressed in Part II. Initially, however, this Part justi-
fies the usefulness of this sort of inquiry, with a view to placing 
this Article in the legal literature and offering a point of depar-
ture for the description that follows. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This Article will put forth a complicated and detailed story 
about how Treasury actually works. It is a picture of path de-
pendence, historical accident, and bureaucratic turf building, 
all contributing to relative independence that led, during the 
financial crisis, to Treasury’s ability to act without much con-
straint from Congress, the President, or the courts.  
But any article that resorts to a departmental organiza-
tional chart to guide its own articulation of subject matter, as 
this one is about to, must answer the question of whether the 
exercise is in fact worth the candle. Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule, for example, have essayed a much less complicated 
story of administrative exercise of authority in crisis, and it is 
one that could be applied to Treasury (though not Treasury 
alone).43 To Posner and Vermeule, Treasury need not be sepa-
rated from the rest of the executive branch, which—channeling 
executive power enthusiasts like Thomas Hobbes and Carl 
Schmitt—they presume to be the only serious vehicle through 
which crises may be addressed.44 Posner and Vermeule’s exam-
ples of executive crisis management without participation by 
the coordinate branches include the aftermath of 9/11 and the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, but one can think of others.45 
Indeed, John Yoo has posited that, during times of crisis, presi-
dents push the limit of their constitutional authority and tend 
to succeed in doing so.46  
 
 43. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4.  
 44. Id. at 16. 
 45. Id. at 17. 
 46. JOHN H. YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: A HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE 
POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH, at xix (2009) (ex-
plaining that “[p]residential power has expanded with each crisis and emer-
gency”). “Our Constitution designed the executive branch to wield power effec-
tively and flexibly, and our history has favored forceful, not constrained, 
Presidencies.” Id. at xx. 
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These accounts posit the executive branch as a unitary 
black box, inseparable from the will of the President, the “man 
on horseback” of the modern administrative state.47 By con-
trast, this Article goes into substantial regulatory detail be-
cause such accounts, in my view, prove too much while an-
swering too little. Why, for example, during the financial crisis 
did Treasury coordinate its response with the Federal Reserve 
and bother with the aggressive interpretation of its statutory 
authority if, in the end, it knew it would not be constrained by 
that authority in crisis? There is every reason to believe that 
those institutions did what they did because they enjoyed the 
legal flexibility as well as the pecuniary resources to act, while 
the White House itself deferred for a variety of reasons, politi-
cal and otherwise.48 Conversely, Treasury need not have acted 
at all if it is inseparable from the rest of the executive branch. 
It could have waited for the President to act by fiat. Or it could 
simply have ordered nationalizations, rather than structuring 
deals, and bailed out, for example, the MMF industry instead of 
exercising its statutory powers over the Exchange Stabilization 
Fund to do so.49 There is no way to predict, privilege, or eval-
uate one or the other of these approaches by taking a Schmit-
tian approach to administrative law, if such an approach means 
ignoring institutional detail. Only a thicker story about what 
exactly does constrain Treasury can offer a more complete ac-
count of what happened during the financial crisis.  
A detailed account of Treasury’s administration is also nec-
essary because it is an administrative regime rarely studied by 
scholars or reviewed by courts, but one that is very lawyered 
up. Lawyers representing clients before the Committee on For-
 
 47. The “man on horseback” trope traditionally involves the takeover of 
the government by a military leader. Since the President is the Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces, perhaps the analogy may be stretched to fit. See 
Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback? Thoughts 
on Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407, 1409 
(2008) (“[D]emocratic organizational theory has long held that civilian institu-
tions and personnel must exercise ultimate authority over the military, lest a 
‘man on horseback’ wrest control of the State from the citizenry.”). 
 48. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 28, at 465–68 (describing the agen-
cies’ legal flexibility); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 36 (“[A] damaged 
president could not fufill the necessary leadership role, but that role quickly 
devolved to the Treasury Secretary and Fed Chair . . . .”). 
 49. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 28, at 470 (“Governments, though, 
again, not the government of the United States, have nationalized firms and 
industries before. But this regulation by deal is new, and it is new in size, 
scale, and scope.”); id. at 504–08 (describing the mechanism by which the 
Treasury guaranteed the money market system). 
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eign Investments in the United States (CFIUS), which Treas-
ury chairs and manages, comprise one of the fastest growing 
bars in Washington D.C. and New York City, with at least five 
lawyers from antitakeover specialists Wachtell Lipton recently 
authoring papers on how to navigate the process.50 The finan-
cial regulation industry is also well advised; indeed, many of 
the largest and most elite law firms in the country have finan-
cial institutions practice groups.51 The current chairman of Sul-
livan and Cromwell, the whitest of white shoe New York law 
firms, is a banking lawyer.52 These individuals appear in court 
rarely and in the pages of law reviews as infrequently. But they 
comprise a large percentage of what sophisticated lawyering is 
all about, and their lawyering depends upon relationships with 
the Treasury Department. Ignoring the way Treasury does its 
business would only continue to write this important part of 
the legal profession out of the annals of legal scholarship.  
B. THE CASE FOR DIFFERENCE 
Treasury, at least in comparison with other agencies, is in-
frequently subject to judicial review, rarely passes rules, and 
does little work with OMB. In this section, I review the case for 
treating Treasury differently. In the sections that follow, I dis-
cuss how Treasury came to occupy its unique place in the fed-
eral administrative scheme. 
The paradigm of administration through the APA is a “ma-
jor rule” made through notice-and-comment.53 But Treasury 
 
 50. As I have discussed elsewhere, antitakeover specialist Wachtell, Lip-
ton, Rosen & Katz had no fewer than five attorneys, including a name partner 
and a chair of its executive committee, pen pieces on the Committee during a 
six-month period between November 2007 and May 2008. Zaring, supra note 
40, at 87; see also Profile of Edward D. Herlihy, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & 
KATZ, http://www.wlrk.com/EDHerlihy (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (listing Her-
lihy as co-chair of Wachtell Lipton’s executive committee). 
 51. Chambers and Partners ranks the four best as Cravath, Swaine & 
Moore; Davis Polk & Wardwell; Simpson Thacher & Bartlett; and Latham & 
Watkins—firms undoubtedly among the most prestigious and lucrative in the 
country. The Chambers and Partners rankings of Banking and Financial In-
stitutions practice groups in the United States may be found at http://www 
.chambersandpartners.com/USA/Editorial/33222 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  
 52. See Alan Feuer, Trauma Surgeon of Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2009, at MB1, available at 2009 WLNR 22970411.  
 53. See John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of 
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 
69–72 (2003) (describing how Treasury does not typically follow APA notice-
and-comment procedures when promulgating temporary regulations and rev-
enue rulings). 
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rarely acts through that sort of rulemaking, and when it does 
pass a rule, it is quite likely to do so without going through the 
notice-and-comment process.54 In the decade between October 
1999 and October 2009, Treasury only issued five so-called ma-
jor rules, almost all of which were done in conjunction with 
other agencies that do find themselves more constrained by the 
APA.55 During the same period, the Department of Transporta-
tion issued forty-one major rules,56 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issued forty-three major rules, and the EPA 
issued forty-five.57 Moreover, Treasury frequently issues rules 
without a notice of proposed rulemaking, which is ordinarily 
required by the APA.58 Indeed, it was one of the “departments 
[to] have been severely criticized for [its] failure to separately 
state and currently publish [its] substantive rules, statements 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. GAO Federal Rules Database Search, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., http://www.gao.gov/fedrules/index.php (search “Department of the Treas-
ury” agency, “All” priority, “Major” rule types, date published in the Federal 
Register between “October 1999” and “October 2009”). A major rule is defined 
as a rule resulting in, or likely to result in, an annual effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more (or meeting certain other criteria). 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) 
(2006). Of the 928 substantive rules promulgated by Treasury during this pe-
riod, 570 originated with the IRS. Compare GAO Federal Rules Database 
Search, supra (search “Department of Treasury” agency, “Signifi-
cant/Substantive” priority, “All” rule types, date published in the Federal Reg-
ister between “October 1999” and “October 2009”), with id. (search “Depart-
ment of Treasury” agency, “Internal Revenue Service” subagency, 
“Significant/Substantive” priority, “All” rule types, date published in the Fed-
eral Register between “October 1999” and “October 2009”) (showing the signif-
icant proportion of IRS rules). The Department of Transportation, by contrast, 
issued 984 rules during this period. Id. (search “Department of Transporta-
tion” agency, “Significant/Substantive” priority, “All” rule types, date pub-
lished in the Federal Register between “October 1999” and “October 2009”). 
 56. GAO Federal Rules Database Search, supra note 55 (search “Depart-
ment of Transportation” agency, “All” priority, “Major” rule types, date pub-
lished in the Federal Register between “October 1999” and “October 2009”). 
 57. Id. (search “Independent Agencies and Govt Corporations” agency, 
“United States Securities and Exchange Commission” subagency, “All” priori-
ty, “Major” rule types, date published in the Federal Register between “Octo-
ber 1999” and “October 2009”); id. (search “Independent Agencies and Govt 
Corporations” agency, “Environmental Protection Agency” subagency, “All” 
priority, “Major” rule types, date published in the Federal Register between 
“October 1999” and “October 2009”). 
 58. Treasury is one of seven agencies mostly likely to issue a rule without 
a notice of proposed rulemaking, ordinarily required by the APA. U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES 
OFTEN PUBLISHED FINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT PROPOSED RULES 12 (1998). 
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of policy and general interpretations” as long ago as 1951, as 
Victor Netterville then observed.59 
Nor is the Department subject to the levels of litigation 
that bedevil other agencies. It is infrequently subject to suit in 
the D.C. Circuit, the premier court for administrative law, as a 
simple count attests.60 Between 1998 and 2008 the SEC was a 
party to fifty-five cases in the D.C. Circuit;61 the EPA was a 
party to 199 cases in the D.C. Circuit;62 and the Department of 
Transportation was a party to thirty-five such cases.63 In con-
trast, Treasury was a party to only fourteen cases during that 
decade, twenty-five percent the level of the SEC, and seven 
percent the EPA number.64 
Trials are no different. Treasury regulates banking in con-
junction with the Federal Reserve.65 Exclusive of tax disputes, 
the government was a defendant in trial court in thirty-six 
banking cases during the one-year period from 2007 to 2008.66 
Over the same period, the EPA was a defendant in 257 cases, 
and the government brought 307 securities cases (the SEC is 
usually only a defendant when one of its rules is challenged be-
fore enforcement, a rare but not unheard of occurrence).67 
Again, the implication is that Treasury neither brings nor de-
fends cases in the federal courts to the extent that other impor-
tant agencies do. 
Moreover, OMB review of Treasury, often thought to be the 
paradigm of alternative supervision to that of the judiciary, is 
 
 59. Victor S. Netterville, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in 
Interpretation, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1951). 
 60. A Westlaw search for ca(“Department of the Treasury”) & da(aft 1956) 
in the CTADC database (reported opinions by the D.C. Circuit) on September 
12, 2010, identified only seventy-five cases since 1956. This includes all cases 
where “Department of the Treasury” is in the caption of the case.  
 61. Westlaw search for ca(“Securities and Exchange Commission”) & 
da(aft 1999 & bef 2008) on September 12, 2010. 
 62. Westlaw search for ca(“Environmental Protection Agency”) & da(aft 
1999 & bef 2008) on September 12, 2010.  
 63. Westlaw search for ca(“Department of Transportation”) & da(aft 1999 
& bef 2008) on September 12, 2010. 
 64. Westlaw search for ca(“Department of the Treasury”) & da(aft 1999 & 
bef 2008) on Sept. 12, 2010. 
 65. See, e.g., Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 28, at 465–66 (providing an 
example of coordination between the two offices in a banking matter). 
 66. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 144 (2008). 
 67. Id. at 144–45. 
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limited.68 Indeed, Treasury spent much of the time after the 
creation of OMB disregarding it.69 And when Treasury was, fi-
nally, subjected to the supervision of the office, that supervision 
proved to be much less strict than it is for the rest of the execu-
tive branch. Between 2004 and 2008, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs, part of OMB, completed only nine eco-
nomically significant reviews for Treasury.70 By comparison, 
the EPA was subjected to fifty-four economically significant re-
views during the same period,71 and the Department of Trans-
portation was subject to forty-five.72 
In one context, the observation that Treasury does not par-
ticipate in ordinary administrative process is not new. In tax, 
the Department has failed to observe the niceties of the APA 
without obvious justification for decades.73 As Kristin Hickman 
 
 68. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 291 (1991) (concluding 
OMB’s “effect on day-to-day decisionmaking should not be overstated”); Bagley 
& Revesz, supra note 13; Bruff, supra note 19; Christopher C. DeMuth & 
Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1075, 1088 (1986) (noting that OMB had left eighty percent of the regula-
tions it reviewed unchanged); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency 
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 
1061 (1986) (explaining that before the OMB’s increased role, judicial review 
and congressional oversight cured most agency mistakes); Alan B. Morrison et 
al., The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 181, 191 (1986) (arguing that authority still resides with agencies and 
that the OMB’s role is supervisory); Steven T. Kargman, Note, OMB Interven-
tion in Agency Rulemaking: The Case for Broadened Record Review, 95 YALE 
L.J. 1789, 1790 (1986) (illustrating how OMB-influenced agency decisions are 
largely untouchable by judicial review). 
 69. See supra notes 12, 19 and accompanying text. 
 70. See Historical Reports, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo 
.gov/public/do/eoHistReviewSearch (select “Department of the Treasury” under 
“Economically Significant Reviews Completed” for each of years 2004–2008) 
(revealing zero, zero, four, two, and three reviews for each year, respectively). 
 71. See id. (select “Environmental Protection Agency” under “Economically 
Significant Reviews Completed” for each of years 2004–2008) (revealing elev-
en, eleven, eight, ten, and fourteen reviews for each year, respectively). 
 72. See id. (select “Department of Transportation” under “Economically 
Significant Reviews Completed” for each of years 2004–2008) (revealing eight, 
eight, six, seven, and sixteen reviews for each year, respectively). It is also 
worth noting that a General Accounting Office (GAO) 2003 report on OMB, 
designed to study OMB’s role in agency rulemaking, examined nine agencies, 
not including Treasury, which is perhaps some evidence that the GAO did not 
consider OMB an important check on Treasury’s authority. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ 
DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 8 (2003).  
 73. Treasury’s fiscal work, to be sure, is often ministerial. It receives tax 
revenues, and issues them pursuant to congressional appropriations to the rel-
  
2010] ADMINISTRATION BY TREASURY 203 
 
has explained, “the status quo evolved slowly, with APA non-
compliance the unanticipated and unintended consequence of 
the well-intentioned pursuit of alternative priorities.”74 Hick-
man found that about forty percent of Treasury’s revenue rules 
do not comply with APA notice-and-comment procedures.75  
Tax, as they say, is different. But it is also exemplary of 
the rather different experience the entirety of the Treasury De-
partment has with traditional administrative procedure, espe-
cially when compared to other agencies that find their missions 
and agendas defined by it. 
C. WHAT TREASURY DOES 
A useful way to make sense of the policymaking role that 
Treasury plays is to examine the Department as it defines it-
self. This approach requires a tour through a slightly simplified 
variant of Treasury’s organizational chart, a perhaps not in-
stantly compelling, but ultimately illustrative, guide to the De-
partment. This section describes what Treasury does by focus-
ing on its three undersecretariats as a way to illustrate the 
Department’s broad remit. It describes the undersecretariats 
and suggests a unifying principle for each. At the same time, 
the descriptions serve the broader goal of illustrating Treas-
ury’s uniqueness among agencies, and evaluating the costs and 
benefits of its alternative administrative law. 
 
evant agencies. Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.treas.gov/education/duties/ (last up-
dated May 25, 2010). The point is only that this fundamental operation of the 
Department is old and one that has never been subject to the usual con-
straints of administrative procedure. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of 
Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative 
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1157 
(2008) (“[S]tatutory provisions and the courts’ own jurisprudence combined 
discourage procedural challenges against Treasury regulations to the point of 
denying taxpayers an adequate judicial remedy to vindicate procedural rights 
granted in the APA.”). 
 74. Hickman, supra note 17, at 1799; see also Coverdale, supra note 53; 
Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymak-
ing, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398–99 (2007) (explaining that administrative 
agencies often create “guidance documents” rather than notice-and-comment 
rules to avoid the requirements of the APA, and using the Treasury Depart-
ment’s Examination Handbook on the operation of thrift institutions as an ex-
ample of such a document). 
 75. Hickman, supra note 17, at 1748 (finding that 40.9 percent of the 232 
rulemaking projects studied did not follow notice-and-comment procedures 
under the APA). Hickman also notes critics of Treasury’s lack of compliance 
with notice-and-comment procedures. Id. at 1730 n.12.  
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76 
Treasury, like almost all departments, has a single secre-
tary in charge, and a deputy secretary with broad, department-
wide responsibilities.77 The undersecretaries are the first set of 
specialists, and only one of them handles revenues.78 Treasury 
began as a getter and spender of government money79—but its 
 
 76. This chart has been adapted from the complete version which can be 
found at US Department of Treasury Organization Chart—Top Level, 
NETAGE.COM, http://www.netage.com/economics/gov/USTreasury-chart-top.html 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2010). A more recent version of this chart has been posted 
on the Department of the Treasury’s website. Treasury Organization Chart, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/open/docs/DAS%20with% 
20bureaus%20org%20chart%208.12.2010.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  
 77. See OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DEPARTMENT 
OF THE TREASURY 16 (2006), available at http://www.treasury.gov/education/ 
history/brochure/brochure.pdf (outlining the structure of Treasury). 
 78. See id. at 15. 
 79. See id. at 1 (detailing Treasury’s historical roots). 
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domestic finance office pairs government finance with financial 
sector regulation, evidencing a move away from this traditional 
function.80 The other two undersecretaries deal with interna-
tional affairs and national security, missions that enjoy special 
protections from the APA’s reach.81 
The undersecretaries exemplify the uniqueness of the De-
partment’s administrative profile and offer a revealing picture 
of much of Treasury’s operation. The remaining units of Treas-
ury, most which report to one of the three undersecretaries, are 
organized into bureaus and offices. Bureaus do the yeoman’s 
work of the Department and employ the vast majority of its 
workers.82 The offices, in contrast, set policy.83 While Treasury 
has activities not supervised by the undersecretaries, with the 
notable exception of tax policy, these activities are small and 
Washington-focused parts of the Department—mostly involving 
its public relations people, economists, and lawyers.84 
Treasury’s success in avoiding APA review lies in the fact 
that while its bureaus perform ministerial work that does not 
involve a litigious regulated industry quick to sue,85 its offices 
increasingly make significant policy in areas where the APA 
does not reach. 
In fact, much of what Treasury does in its bureaus is what 
it has done since its founding in 1789. Treasury collects taxes, 
issues debt, and disperses the proceeds to government agencies 
as Congress directs.86 The acquisition of money accounts for the 
vast majority of employment within the Department, which as 
of January 2009, employed 105,668 full-time employees, 90,466 
of which worked for the Internal Revenue Service.87 Another 
526 of the remaining employees collect alcohol and tobacco tax-
es.88 
 
 80. See Office of Domestic Finance, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http:// 
www.treasury.gov/offices/domestic-finance/ (last updated Apr. 15, 2010). 
 81. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2006) (exempting functions involving the military 
or foreign affairs from administrative procedure requirements). 
 82. See OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, supra note 77, at 15. 
 83. See id. at 14. 
 84. See Treasury Organization Chart, supra note 76. 
 85. Tax is a notable exception, and its own phenomenon—one that this 
Article will largely leave to the ministrations of tax scholars. 
 86. See OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, supra note 77, at 14–15. 
 87. Federal Employment Statistics, U.S. OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT. (Jan. 
2009), http://www.opm.gov/feddata/html/2009/January/table15.asp. 
 88. Id. It is worth noting that nothing in the argument of this Article 
turns on the idiosyncratic, elaborate, and massive tax regime that has its own 
independent bureau only nominally within Treasury, its own rules, its own 
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But it has become apparent, particularly during the finan-
cial crisis, that Treasury is much more than a tax collection and 
fundraising organization. Accordingly, this section focuses on 
Treasury’s nontax efforts, including those used to respond to 
the financial crisis and to regulate various critical areas of both 
the domestic and administrative economy.89 
Treasury has achieved APA autonomy by increasingly spe-
cializing in areas that happen to lie outside of the APA’s pur-
view. While banking supervision, to be sure, is subject to the 
APA, it tends to be a rather collaborative exercise in practice.90 
Treasury’s other specialties, including government finance,91 
financial law enforcement, international affairs, and national 
security, are traditionally and/or effectively outside the prov-
ince of the APA.92  
These issues have grown in importance over the past three 
decades to the point where President George W. Bush said that 
what Treasury does as a law enforcer is “a major thrust of our 
war on terrorism.”93 The increasingly international nature of 
what Treasury does is also a new development, one that paral-
lels the growth of the G-level government ministerial process, 
as well as the increasing international interconnection of the 
U.S. economy and the inclination of most government agencies 
(not just financial regulators) to join global networks to deal 
with the problems of regulating domestic economies in an in-
terconnected world.94 The remainder of this section explores 
the undersecretariats’ functions in greater detail and describes 
just how far outside the ordinary realm of administrative pro-
cedure Treasury operates.  
 
courts, and its own bar. Still, tax’s idiosyncrasy is both instructive and repli-
cated elsewhere in the Department. 
 89. For the Federal Management Service, which is comprised of many of 
the remaining employees of the Department, the APA is much less relevant 
than the Red Book, which governs the federal government’s fiscal outlays. 
 90. See infra Part I.C.1.a (discussing banking regulation). 
 91. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2006) (excepting from APA “matter[s] relat-
ing to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, 
benefits or contracts”). Indeed, some early versions of the APA specifically ex-
empted the fiscal operations of the Treasury from review entirely. Foster H. 
Sherwood, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
271, 276 (1947). 
 92. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2006). 
 93. Bush: ‘We Will Starve the Terrorists,’ CNN.COM (Sept. 24, 2001), http:// 
archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/24/ret.bush.transcript/. 
 94. See, e.g., Treasury Organization Chart, supra note 76 (displaying in-
ternational Treasury officers serving under the Under Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs). 
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1. Domestic Finance 
The Undersecretary for Domestic Finance handles a pa-
noply of activities, marrying the development of policy for 
banking regulators—and accordingly, the regulatory environ-
ment of banks—with the monitoring of the financial markets.95  
It is banking regulation that gets attention these days; but 
the financial operations conducted under the Undersecretary’s 
aegis are some of the Department’s oldest.96 Nonetheless, be-
cause Treasury does the most regulating in the banking arena, 
it is worth exploring its principles-based, less-adversarial-than-
some nature.97 It is also worth remembering that this sort of 
regulation is hardly the only thing the Department does. As a 
regulator, Treasury embodies a cooperative approach, where its 
leaders speak on the phone with the institutions they oversee 
more than do senior officials at other agencies, perhaps more 
than any other agency in the government.98 As a financier, 
Treasury is subject not to the APA, but to the alternative ad-
ministrative procedure of money. 
a. Banking Regulation 
Treasury, or, specifically, two of its bureaus—the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) (which are in the process of being consoli-
dated pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act)99—supervise federally 
 
 95. See Office of Domestic Finance, supra note 80 (outlining duties of the 
office). 
 96. See OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, supra note 77, at 2–6 (outlining the ear-
ly financial duties of Treasury). 
 97. This review is admittedly broad-brush; multivolume treatises have 
been written about the details of banking regulation. See, e.g., HENRY J. 
BAILEY & RICHARD B. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS (2010) (multi-
volume treatise on regulation and case law related to bank checks and com-
mercial paper); INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW AND REGULATION (Dennis 
Campbell ed., 2000) (two-volume treatise on international banking regulation); 
MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION (1994) (three-volume 
treatise on banking regulation); MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING (P.A. Ernest 
ed., 2004) (thirteen-volume comprehensive treatise on banking law and regu-
lation); WILLIAM H. SCHLICHTING ET AL., BANKING LAW (2010) (regularly up-
dated nine-volume treatise on banking law). 
 98. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Regulator Let In-
dyMac Bank Falsify Report, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2008, at A1 (noting regula-
tors’ conference calls with bank officials). 
 99. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 311–319, 124 Stat. 1376, 1520–28 (2010). 
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chartered banks and federally chartered thrifts, respectively.100 
The goal for both of these agencies is to keep the institutions 
“safe and sound,” as they are all covered by federal deposit in-
surance.101 This arrangement means that the government must 
pay for institutions that fail, and so has an abiding interest in 
preventing them from doing so.102 To that end, OCC and OTS 
deploy examiners to each of the banks they regulate, where 
they comb through the books, inspect the sites, and stay close 
to management.103 Undoubtedly, there are plenty of rules sub-
ject to which these entities must operate; banking regulation 
looks, at least superficially, a lot like the rest of administrative 
law. And certainly, though rarely, courts play important roles 
in giving texture to the sort of oversight that Treasury exercis-
es over the financial industry.104 
But the regulation of financial institutions is a famously 
nonadversarial process. Financial regulators that have adopted 
principles-based regulation—such as most banking regulators 
across the globe, and also some in the United States—offer lit-
tle that is reviewable to courts like the D.C. Circuit.105 Prin-
ciples-based regulation is often enforced through phone calls 
 
 100. About the OCC, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas 
.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010); About the OTS, OFF. THRIFT 
SUPERVISION, http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=AboutOTS (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
Bank holding companies, however, are regulated by the Federal Reserve. See 
Federal Reserve Board Frequently Asked Questions: Banking Information, FED. 
RES. BOARD, http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqbkinfo.htm (last 
updated July 16, 2010). Because the largest and most important banks include 
bank holding companies, it is fair to say that these institutions have two regu-
lators, which may not always, at least when it comes to the details, get along. 
 101. Who is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/ 
learn/symbol/WhoistheFDIC.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 102. See, e.g., About the OCC, supra note 100 (outlining OCC’s preventative 
measures, including removing failing banks’ officers and changing banking 
practices). 
 103. See id. (noting OCC’s supervisory activities); see also About the OTS, 
supra note 100 (explaining OTS’s role in supervision). 
 104. See Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial Hold-
ing Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 523–28 (1994) (describing judicial 
oversight over the enforceability of capital maintenance commitments); Kieran 
J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique of the 
“Source-of-Strength” Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 
1372–80 (1991) (describing judicial oversight of the Federal Reserve Board’s 
source-of-strength policy). 
 105. For analyses of rules-based versus principles-based regulations, see 
generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of 
“Principles-Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Ac-
counting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
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and jawboning, rather than through enforcement orders and 
prohibitions that can lead to litigation.106 Moreover, for bank-
ing regulators, many of the regulatory standards are not passed 
by rule, but by international arrangement through the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, which promulgates the 
baseline rules on how much capital banks must hold in their 
coffers.107 Also, much of the regulation on the ground occurs via 
on-site examiners who enforce quite informally and often on a 
face-to-face and confidential, instead of a written and public, 
basis.108 This sort of close, informal supervision has contributed 
to the independence of the Department. 
Moreover, Treasury and its regulated industry are largely 
pursuing similar objectives. Because of its mission for safety 
and soundness, Treasury wants banks to make enough money 
to remain solvent—a goal that dovetails, of course, with the 
ends of bank owners.109 Moreover, the banking charter is itself 
valuable, meaning that regulated banks benefit from the re-
strictions on their activity provided by the government—
especially because those restrictions are paired with deposit in-
surance, which guarantees that banks will be able to borrow 
from their depositors at quite low rates.110 Banks, in short, 
quite rationally want to be regulated by Treasury. 
The result is that a culture of regulation has developed in 
which the bank regulators and the banks themselves work to-
gether closely.111 This culture of cooperation toward safety and 
 
 106. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 98 (discussing prin-
ciples-based regulators’ tendency to regulate through conference calls). There 
are few principles-based regulators in the federal government. Those that do 
exist—such as the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)—enjoy 
a more limited relationship with the judiciary and possibly with their execu-
tive and congressional supervisors than the more rules-based and enforce-
ment-oriented agencies. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? 
The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 795 (2009) (comparing the CFTC’s prin-
ciples-based regulation to the rules-based SEC); DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 11 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/ 
releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (characterizing the CFTC as adopting a “prin-
ciples-based regulatory philosophy”).  
 107. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International 
Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547, 573 (2005). 
 108. See About the OCC, supra note 100 (describing on-site reviews). 
 109. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 98 (describing OTS as 
behaving more like “consultants, not cops”). 
 110. See id. (noting that banks classified by Treasury as “well capitalized” 
are able to receive deposits from brokers). 
 111. See id. (questioning the Agency’s cozy “relationship with the compa-
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soundness stands in marked contrast to the ordinarily adver-
sarial nature of regulation by other agencies. Indeed, some ar-
gue that the confluence of interests has made Treasury particu-
larly beholden to its regulated industry.112 Even if that is the 
case, and this Article takes no position on that issue, the result 
is that banks sue Treasury or its institutions to undo rules less 
often than, say, the securities industry sues the SEC.113 
b. Government Finance 
Treasury also routes much of its government finance 
work—its original raison d’être—through the Undersecretary 
for Domestic Finance.114 This sort of finance is not the source of 
Treasury’s rather impressive power over the economy, but it is 
an important area of governance, one often ignored by legal 
scholars. And Treasury, subject once again to its own unique 
administrative practice, plays a crucial role. 
Its Office of the Fiscal Service, which reports to the Under-
secretary, “develop[s] policy for and operate[s] the financial in-
frastructure of the [f]ederal government.”115 The infrastructure 
itself is not riveting, but it does matter: it includes “payments, 
collections, cash management, financing, central accounting, 
and delinquent debt collection,” as the Department itself de-
fines it.116 This infrastructure includes the Financial Manage-
ment Service, which doles money out to federal agencies pur-
suant to their congressional appropriations after receiving it 
from the IRS, and the Bureau of the Public Debt, which does 
the ministerial work of debt finance: selling Treasury bills, and 
so on.117  
 
nies it regulates”). 
 112. See id. (stating that “OTS fail[s] to enforce its own rules” with respect 
to regulated banks). 
 113. See Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 
87 B.U. L. REV. 625, 671 (2007) (“The Treasury Department . . . [has] numer-
ous structural and practical constraints preventing . . . capture.”). But see 
Johnson, supra note 4, at 52 (discussing the American financial sector and not-
ing “[f ]rom this confluence of campaign finance, personal connections, and ide-
ology there flowed, in just the past decade, a river of deregulatory policies”). 
 114. See Office of Domestic Finance, supra note 80 (listing the office’s duties). 
 115. Office of Fiscal Service: About the Office of Fiscal Service, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/fiscal 
-service/ (last modified Dec. 5, 2008). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. In performing this role, for what it is worth, Domestic Finance 
has stayed true to its light, principles-based approach. It has regulated the 
markets for the sale of its debt with a much lighter touch than that exercised 
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Accordingly, there is a fundamental, albeit ministerial, 
part of Treasury’s responsibility that is entirely separate from 
administrative procedure. This budgetary role has long been 
outside the purview of judicial review—much of it is exempted 
from rulemaking entirely under 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)—and this 
traditional role probably informs the way the rest of the De-
partment operates.118 
To be sure, this role is not bereft of oversight. Federal ap-
propriations law, guided by congressional appropriations sta-
tutes and annual budgets, largely determines how the money 
Treasury has raised is spent.119 There is a great deal of inters-
titial and “rules of the road” guidance in these principles that 
fills the gaps that the ordinarily very lengthy appropriations 
legislation leaves behind. There is even a treatise expounding 
those rules of the road—the so-called Red Book.120 But the Red 
Book is written by the Government Accountability Office, ra-
ther than Treasury.121 So it is not that the Department makes 
the rules in this area; still, Treasury is intimately bound up in 
fiscal questions, and matters of fiscal oversight are rarely pre-
sented as matters of administrative procedure. This fiscal role, 
longstanding as it has been, however, arguably contributed to 
Treasury’s unique form of administrative procedure. Its more 
recent responsibilities, as represented by its two other undersec-
retaries, develop this theme. There, as well as here, the over-
sight comes loosely from Congress instead of tightly through 
the courts. 
 
by other American capital markets regulators. See Edward W. Little, Jr., 
Comment, Legislating in Secret: The Treasury Department’s Thirty-Five Per-
cent Rule and the “Public Contracts” Exemption to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 545, 545 (1992) (describing Treasury’s authori-
zation to oversee government debt). 
 118. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193–94 (1993) (holding that the In-
dian Health Service’s decision to discontinue a program providing services to 
handicapped Indian children was not subject to judicial review because Con-
gress gave the Agency a lump sum appropriation which it had discretion to 
allocate). Section 553(a)(2) exempts from rulemaking “a matter relating to 
agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, 
or contracts.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2006). 
 119. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (“The estab-
lished rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when author-
ized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by 
Congress.” (citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291 (1850))). 
 120. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW (3d ed. 2004).  
 121. Id.  
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2. International Affairs 
Treasury also develops policy in international monetary af-
fairs, trade and investment policy, and international debt 
strategy, and has devoted a second of its three undersecretaries 
to overseeing its international work.122 International affairs, 
like government finance, are exempt from the APA.123 As the 
world has globalized, Treasury’s increasingly important role in 
setting—and critically, coordinating—U.S. policy abroad has 
inexorably led to an expansion of discretion in setting policy at 
home.124 In this role, Treasury regulates not by fiat, but 
through informal cooperation.  
As an international policymaker, Treasury guides U.S. 
participation in international financial institutions, including, 
most notably, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).125 It coordinates American policy for the G-level 
ministerial process and prepares the President for economic 
summits.126 It also participates actively in the financial regula-
tory networks that have sought to develop common rules for the 
regulation of global finance.127 
Treasury thus acts as an international participant in the 
shaping of domestic regulation, not just for the United States, 
but also for regulators across the globe. In the IMF, for exam-
ple, it has pushed its own policies in the restructuring of sover-
eign debt.128 In the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
 
 122. See Treasury Organization Chart, supra note 76. 
 123. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2006). For further discussion of this exemption, 
see Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring 
the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 241–42 (2009). 
 124. See Zaring, supra note 107, at 597–600 (discussing democratic over-
sight of international regulatory cooperation); see also Robert D. Putnam, Dip-
lomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 
427, 454–56 (1988) (discussing reverberation between international and do-
mestic negotiations). 
 125. See Office of International Affairs: Offices, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/offices.shtml (last 
updated Aug. 4, 2010) (discussing the role of the Office of Development Policy 
and Debt in advising the U.S. government on its international economic devel-
opment efforts).  
 126. See REBECCA M. NELSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE G-20 AND 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CONGRESS 8 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40977 
.pdf (noting Treasury’s role in coordinating with various federal agencies to 
prepare for the G20 summit).  
 127. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Jonathan Sedlak, Comment, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statu-
tory Reform or Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1484 (2004) 
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it has tried to ensure that the regulation of banking capital 
adequacy is consistent with U.S. interests.129 And in the G20, it 
has pursued the same interests regarding the relationship be-
tween metropolitan and offshore financial havens, among many 
other things.130  
Much of what Treasury does through its International Af-
fairs Undersecretariat might best be described as regulation 
through international networks. Such networks exhibit “pat-
tern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like govern-
ment units working across the borders that divide countries 
from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ from the 
‘international’ sphere.”131 The goals of these networks include 
cooperating on law enforcement and harmonizing regulatory 
standards.132 Informal institutions in their own right, these 
networks afford Treasury domestic regulatory flexibility. By 
operating internationally, Treasury has evaded many of the 
constraints it would otherwise face in pure domestic regulation, 
as Robert Putnam has shown.133 In addition, as international 
networks have become foci of the response to the financial cri-
sis,134 Treasury will likely only do more of its regulatory work 
in coordination with these international institutions, which are 
themselves an alternative to domestic notice-and-comment 
law.135  
Treasury also takes the lead in coordinating U.S. participa-
tion in the increasingly important G20 process.136 That process 
 
(noting Treasury’s advocacy for inclusion of collective action clauses in lenders’ 
debt instruments). 
 129. See generally Zaring, supra note 107, at 573–80 (noting the involve-
ment of American regulators, including the Treasury’s OCC, in the capital ac-
cord negotiation process). 
 130. Cf. NELSON, supra note 126, at 8, 12 (noting Treasury’s role in rep-
resenting the United States in the G20 and enumerating targeted regulatory 
reforms). 
 131. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 14 (2004). 
 132. Id. at 51–52 (categorizing regulatory government networks as infor-
mation, enforcement, and harmonization networks). 
 133. See Putnam, supra note 124, at 454–56.  
 134. The new Financial Stability Board is an example of this response. See 
History, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/ 
history.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (discussing creation of the Financial 
Stability Board by G20 nations to improve international financial regulation 
and promote financial stability). 
 135. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 107, at 565 (noting, for example, that the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions’ administrative proce-
dures are not subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA). 
 136. NELSON, supra note 126. 
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features heads of state meetings that are always preceded by 
meetings of Treasury officials and foreign finance ministries.137 
The purpose of the G20 is to deal with the global economy.138 
The G7, a predecessor to the G20, was founded in the mid-
1970s by heads of state of the developed Western economies 
and has since grown to include some representatives of the de-
veloping world.139 In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the 
G20 has taken on the responsibility of designing a global regu-
latory architecture to identify and respond to bubbles and inci-
pient panics across borders.140  
Never formalized by treaty, the G20 has no legal status. It 
has neither promulgated bylaws or rules for decisionmaking 
nor created a secretariat or administrative bureaucracy. In 
short, the G20 is a politicized organization of heads of states 
pressing their countries’ interests in an at-will, discretionary 
environment.141 The G20 views itself as a “consultation proce-
dure,” instead of an international institution.142 And critically, 
in setting global economic policy, Treasury and finance minis-
ters are almost as central as the heads of state that prompted 
the formation of the organization. 
In short, Treasury’s role in the G20, like much of what 
Treasury does, is replete with discretion and informality. To be 
sure, the international entities in which it formulates domestic 
policy are different—an international lawyer might evaluate an 
international organization like the IMF, a network like the Ba-
sel Committee, and a purely political outfit like the G20 differ-
ently, especially with regard to the legal force of the interna-
tional rules they promulgate.143 Nonetheless, with each of these 
 
 137. For a discussion of the G20, see generally David Zaring, International 
Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 493–99 (2010).  
 138. See id. 
 139. See Peter I. Hajnal & John J. Kirton, The Evolving Role and Agenda of 
the G7/G8: A North American Perspective, 7 NIRA REV. 5, 6 (2000), available 
at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/hajnal_nira.pdf. 
 140. See Zaring, supra note 137, at 493 (“[The G20] has come to be the ba-
sis of the initial policymaking response to the crisis that we have seen at a 
global level.”).  
 141. Id. at 496. 
 142. The G8: Questions About the G8, G8—SOMMET EVIAN SUMMIT 2003, 
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/the_g8/questions_about_the_g8.html# 
question5 (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (noting that the G8 has no official lan-
guage because it is not an international organization). 
 143. After all, while the G20 may be what political scientists call a regime, 
in that it creates “sets of governing arrangements” that include “networks of 
rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects,” 
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international entities, Treasury has elected to make policy in a 
way that is outside the regime of traditional, APA-style law. As 
is the case with Treasury’s other, non-APA style activities, it is 
Congress that most closely supervises its international af-
fairs.144 Even Congress, however, has limited oversight capabil-
ities over the technical, yet important, standards that Treasury 
executes in conjunction with its foreign counterparts.  
3. National Security 
Finally, Treasury is increasingly playing a national securi-
ty role, which three of its policymaking offices exemplify: the 
Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the Committee on For-
eign Investments in the United States (CFIUS). The purpose of 
these offices is to starve terrorists and other potential adversar-
ies and undesirables of funding and to ensure that adverse for-
eign governments do not obtain critical U.S. assets.145 Here 
again, the supervision is light, probably too light. And once 
again, it comes through Congress, not the APA and the courts. 
Through these offices, Treasury uses civil administrative tools 
to pursue a security (be it anticriminal or national) enterprise, 
an odd combination of methods and goals. 
With its new powers, such as those granted in the USA 
PATRIOT Act,146 Treasury has imposed broad new regulations 
 
ROBERT D. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 19 
(1977), it was never a “regime invested with any of the trappings of legal for-
mality, or even quasi-legal network-like status,” Zaring, supra note 137, at 
496. See also Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables (1982), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (defining “regimes”). 
 144. See Zaring, supra note 107, at 597. 
 145. OFAC “administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based 
on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals.” Office of Foreign Assets 
Control: Mission, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ 
enforcement/ofac/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). “FinCEN’s mission is 
to enhance U.S. national security, deter and detect criminal activity, and safe-
guard financial systems from abuse by promoting transparency in the U.S. 
and international financial systems.” FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
http://www.fincen.gov/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). CFIUS determines the effect 
on national security of “transactions that could result in control of a U.S. busi-
ness by a foreign person.” Office of Investment Security: Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http:// 
www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/ (last updated Feb. 20, 2009). 
 146. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 301–377, 115 Stat. 272, 296–342 (codified as amended 
in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). This section of the USA PATRIOT Act is also 
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on banks, made decisions about which foreign purchases of 
American assets will be permitted (the grounds for denial are 
that they put national security at risk or critical infrastructure 
in the hands of non-Americans) and, perhaps most troublingly, 
is empowered to visit severe sanctions on individuals, groups, 
and institutions without complying with Fourth Amendment 
limits on the ability to seize property without obtaining a war-
rant.147 These efforts are coordinated through the Department’s 
third undersecretariat, the Undersecretariat for Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence.148 
This national security role is not entirely new. But it has 
expanded vastly in the past two decades in response to, first, 
the war on drugs, and second, the war on terror. These wars 
have prompted Congress to give Treasury new powers to ad-
dress national security threats.149 And Treasury has inter-
preted those powers aggressively. These new powers are anoth-
er facet of the modern Treasury Department’s exemption from 
ordinary administrative procedure (or criminal procedure, for 
that matter) in matters that increasingly occupy much of the 
Department’s attention.  
The Undersecretary oversees OFAC and FinCEN, two of 
the offices that exemplify Treasury’s national security role.150 
Treasury’s role in CFIUS, as the head of an interagency com-
mittee, is related to the national security work of the other two 
offices. However, while those offices seek to freeze the assets of 
wrongdoers, CFIUS oversees a process that turns away the as-
sets of disfavored foreign investors before they may be de-
ployed.151 
 
known as the “International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial An-
ti-Terrorism Act of 2001.” Id. § 301. 
 147. For a discussion of these new powers, see Zaring, supra note 40, at 95–
97. As the 9/11 Commission has observed, “the use of administrative orders with 
few due process protections, particularly against our own citizens, raises sig-
nificant civil liberty concerns and risks a substantial backlash.” NAT’L COMM’N 
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINAN-
CING 50 (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/ 
911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH]. 
 148. See Terrorism and Financial Intelligence: Mission, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
TREASURY, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ (last updated Aug. 4, 
2010). 
 149. See, e.g., David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to 
War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2007) (highlighting the use of new powers 
pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act). 
 150. See Organization Chart, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www 
.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/pdf/org-chart.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).  
 151. See Zaring, supra note 40, at 84–85 (detailing the transaction review 
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Although this section will describe and analyze this admin-
istrative regime as it exists, it is not a regime that normatively 
does the Department much justice. Treasury’s national security 
powers sweep extraordinarily broadly, but inexpertly balance 
rights and national interests. Its power over foreign invest-
ment, for example, is frighteningly uncabined in theory, but in 
fact is a rather toothless congressional notification service. Its 
power over other perceived national security threats constitute 
a combination of undesirable turf-building and an exploitation 
of civil means to do criminal work that poses its own set of 
problems. If this Article ultimately suggests that much of what 
Treasury does is positive, if unorthodox, its national security 
functions present a cautionary side of the coin—perhaps the 
strongest counterargument to the cautious embrace of Treas-
ury’s approach to administrative procedure is taken here. 
a. The Office of Foreign Assets Control 
Although the story of Treasury’s national security role is 
mostly a story about the last two decades, Treasury first exer-
cised these powers to wage economic war in World War I. 
Through the Trading with the Enemy Act, initially passed in 
1917, Congress gave the Department the power to “freeze” the 
assets located in the United States of the foreign sovereigns at 
war with the country.152 Since then, those powers have grown 
to cover less obvious enemies of the United States. Asset freez-
es have been used against nonwarring foreign powers such as 
Cuba and North Korea, and more recently have also been ap-
plied to individuals instead of foreign powers.153 Current OFAC 
interventions range from drug interdiction efforts, to counter-
terrorism, to the imposition of sanctions on Cuba.154  
Although the Department’s OFAC efforts target criminal 
activity such as narco-trafficking and terrorism, it pursues 
these activities with civil law enforcement tools, including as-
sets freezes, which are not subject to Fourth Amendment con-
straints.155 This ability to use the lower civil burdens of proof to 
pursue what are essentially criminal law enforcement goals is 
what makes Treasury such an effective actor in national securi-
 
procedure followed by CFIUS). 
 152. Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 95a (2006)).  
 153. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 1405. 
 154. See id. at 1400. 
 155. Id. at 1394. 
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ty—albeit one that should give civil libertarians, and propo-
nents of technical bureaucratic expertise, pause. 
Treasury’s response to the war on terror illustrates how its 
powers have evolved.156 Twelve days after 9/11, because of “the 
pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of 
foreign terrorists,”157 the President issued an executive order 
declaring a national emergency and authorizing the Secretary 
of the Treasury to freeze the assets of individuals or groups 
that “assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or tech-
nological support for, or financial or other services to or in sup-
port of, such acts of terrorism.”158 OFAC is the office charged 
with drawing up lists of the individuals and groups that meet 
these criteria—the executive branch then institutes freezes 
against them.159  
The power to freeze assets—to which the USA PATRIOT 
Act added the ability to “block” assets during the pendency of 
civil investigations into whether given individuals, entities, or 
organizations were engaged in forbidden activities160—came 
 
 156. Some of OFAC’s terrorism regulation predates 9/11, however. The An-
titerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), for example, 
authorizes the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO). See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2006). Such a designa-
tion is significant because it allows OFAC to freeze all assets of the designated 
organization that are in the United States or controlled by a U.S. financial in-
stitution. See id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 1394 
n.142 (discussing other consequences of FTO designation). 
 157. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001). 
OFAC acted “under presidential wartime and national emergency powers and 
authority granted by specific legislation to impose controls on transactions and 
freeze foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction.” The Oil-for-Food Program: Track-
ing the Funds: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 53 
(2004) (statement of Herbert A. Biern, Senior Associate Director, Division of 
Banking Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve Board), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2004/20041117/default.htm. 
 158. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1(d)(i), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080. The authority 
for these freezes came from the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA). 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (2006). For more, see Nina J. Crimm, 
High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Im-
plications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Phi-
lanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341, 1370–73 (2004) (explaining specially 
designated global terrorist classifications). 
 159. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 1397 (discussing how the di-
rector of OFAC initiates asset freezes). These lists are subject to review under 
the APA, but also subject to the usual deference courts afford the Executive in 
national security matters. See id. at 1398 (stating that challenges to OFAC 
blocking orders rarely succeed). 
 160. The USA PATRIOT Act permits OFAC to 
investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, 
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from the successor statutes to the Trading with the Enemies 
Act.161 After 9/11, the President expanded the reach of this tool 
to individuals by establishing a list of proscribed individuals 
and organizations whose assets are subject to “freezure.”162 
These freezures, so-called because the government does not 
consider them a search or seizure, are powerful tools that reach 
every piece of property that the target has, including hard 
drives, office contents, and funds.163 This “stop now” order, done 
without a search warrant, is a remarkable law enforcement 
tool. Indeed, “when executive branch officials discuss asset 
freezes, they describe the basis for an asset freeze as merely a 
‘belief ’ (which is consistent with the broad discretion provided 
by the statute).”164 A freeze is born on the signing of “[o]nly a 
single piece of paper” by the not particularly exalted director of 
OFAC—a fact that bothered the 9/11 Commission.165 And judi-
 
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, 
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, im-
portation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, 
power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any 
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any 
interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).  
 161. Pursuant to the pre-9/11 IEEPA, the President was granted the au-
thority “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President de-
clares a national emergency with respect to such threat.” Id. § 1701(a). IEEPA 
gave the president the ability to freeze the assets of nations with whom the 
United States is either at war, or that he had designated to be a national enemy. 
Id. § 1702(a)(1). The statute also provides for the sanctioning of supporters 
and nationals of the enemy. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(C). For a discussion of how the 
USA PATRIOT Act altered the IEEPA, see Crimm, supra note 158, at 1357–59. 
 162. OFAC maintains this list on its website. Office of Foreign Assets Control: 
Specially Designated Nationals List, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www 
.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/ (last updated Oct. 19, 2010); see also 
Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,079–80 (Sept. 25, 2001). 
 163. See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 
2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2002), aff ’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (describing the 
freezing of the group’s assets as well as the seizure of documents, computers, 
and furniture from the group’s offices); Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 
1398 n.159 (noting the government’s argument that an asset freeze does not 
fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment because it does not search 
the frozen property).  
 164. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between State Power and 
State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
15, 39 n.90 (2004). 
 165. 9/11 COMMISSION MONOGRAPH, supra note 147, at 99, 112. “This pro-
vision lets the government shut down an organization without any formal de-
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cial review, the remedy for those whose assets have been 
blocked during the pendency of an investigation, is lenient in 
the context of national security, as noted earlier.166 By 2008, 
OFAC had blocked $323 million from sanctioned states and 
$148 million in assets of individuals deemed to be associated 
with foreign enemies.167 
In sum, OFAC exemplifies how Treasury now focuses on 
law enforcement and investigation in a manner that is incon-
sistent with the usual rules of administrative law. It generates 
these lists through a relatively secret process, without notice-
and-comment. The lists result in action by an agency that, in 
its freezes, neither follows the disciplines of the Fourth 
Amendment nor basic legal standards of predeprivation notice. 
b. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
The second major part of Treasury’s law enforcement and 
national security regime is FinCEN. If OFAC is an example of 
Treasury’s ability to get around the problems of criminal proce-
dure, FinCEN, although it performs a related function with re-
gard to tracking wrongdoers, is an example of the impositions 
the non-APA part of Treasury can make on regulated industry. 
Complying with FinCEN’s anti-money laundering reporting re-
quirements is very expensive.168 This center (a combination of 
“bureau” and “office” in Treasury parlance) is also a beneficiary 
of Treasury’s increasing focus on security threats.169 The impli-
cation, once again, is that Treasury is here doing something 
 
termination of wrongdoing. It requires a single piece of paper, signed by a mid-
level government official.” Id. at 112.  
 166. As one court quoted when discussing OFAC, when an “agency’s rea-
sons and policy choices . . . ‘conform to certain minimal standards of rationali-
ty’ . . . the rule is reasonable and must be upheld.” Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d 
at 67 (quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 
506, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). In that case, the charities alleged that OFAC’s ac-
tions violated the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause, the Fourth 
Amendment ban on unreasonable search and seizure, the First Amendment 
rights to freedom of speech and association, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, and the APA. Id. at 75.  
 167. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT 2 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ 
enforcement/ofac/reports/tar2008.pdf. 
 168. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 1413 (noting that U.S. banks 
spent approximately $125 million in both 2003 and 2004 to comply with Fin-
CEN regulations and that “[h]igh-end estimates have placed the total costs of 
the money-laundering laws as $7 billion in 2003”). 
 169. See id. at 1414–15 (describing FinCEN’s expansion of discretion and 
power). 
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important, burdensome, and expensive, and yet has managed 
to avoid much judicial oversight—although financial interme-
diaries have lobbied the Department and the legislature to lim-
it the sweeping scope of their terrorism tracking obligations.  
As I have detailed elsewhere,170 FinCEN has its roots in 
the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA),171 which Congress passed 
to prevent tax evaders from hiding their taxable assets in fed-
erally regulated banks.172 The BSA requires banks and other 
federally regulated financial institutions to report large or oth-
erwise suspicious transactions to the Treasury Department.173 
The statute’s reporting requirements were also meant to make 
it difficult for criminal enterprises to launder their money. The 
USA PATRIOT Act expanded the reach of the BSA’s criminal 
sanctions,174 empowered the Treasury Department to pursue 
civil penalties against these launderers,175 and increased the 
reporting requirements on, and broadened the definition of, fi-
nancial institutions subject to the BSA.176 The goal of these 
amendments was to interdict the flow of money to terrorists, by 
forcing them out of financial institutions with large disclosure 
obligations to the government.177 But these reporting require-
 
 170. See id. at 1409–18 (discussing FinCEN in more detail). 
 171. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951–1959 (2006), 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311–5314, 5316–
5322 (2006)). 
 172. See Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26–30 (1974) (discuss-
ing the prevention of money laundering and other purposes of the BSA). 
 173. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314, 5316–5322 (allowing Treasury to require 
reporting under a number of different circumstances). 
 174. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006) (expanding the number of predicate 
penalties for a money laundering charge); id. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (2006) (adding 
the provision of monetary support to the list of crimes under the Antiterrorism 
Act); id. § 1960 (2006) (deeming the operation of an unlicensed money transfer 
business a crime of general, rather than specific, intent); 31 U.S.C. § 5332 
(2006) (criminalizing the transportation of bulk cash).  
 175. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b). For a description of this provision, see Zaring 
& Baylis, supra note 149, at 1410 n.228.  
 176. See Robert W. Helm & Kevin K. Babikian, Creating, Managing and 
Distributing Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, in NUTS & 
BOLTS OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 2005: UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD 
OF CAPITAL MARKET & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS 715, 964 (PLI 
Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1471, 2005). 
 177. See The Financial War on Terrorism and the Administration’s Imple-
mentation of Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearings Before the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 60 (2002) (statement of 
Michael Chertoff, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Jus-
tice) (“Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act has provided law enforcement with 
important new authority to investigate and prosecute the financing of crime, 
including terrorism.”). 
  
222 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:187 
 
ments have had profound practical consequences. While Fin-
CEN nominally aims to support law enforcement by trolling as-
sets for signs of terrorists, organized criminals, and tax evad-
ers,178 much of the Agency’s actual activity involves policing the 
report filing programs of the financial institutions covered by 
the BSA and the USA PATRIOT Act.179 
Moreover, defining exactly which financial institutions 
must comply with its requirements is largely up to FinCEN. A 
vast array of institutions and individuals are now subject to re-
porting requirements, including credit unions, commodity trad-
ing advisors, and informal or unlicensed transmitters of mon-
ey.180 That last category may be broad enough to render BSA 
reporting requirements applicable to pawnbrokers, hawallas, 
and even the most casual moneylending schemes.181 And the 
Treasury Department is empowered to further expand the list 
of covered institutions.182 Though its expansion has so far hap-
pened in a comment-responsive way, FinCEN has since re-
sorted to few typical administrative law tools to justify its im-
positions on the financial sector.183 
Entities and individuals subject to the BSA—and its ex-
pansion via the USA PATRIOT Act—must jump through a 
number of regulatory hurdles, including filing Suspicious Activ-
ity Reports,184 establishing anti-money laundering programs,185 
 
 178. Mission, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/ 
about_fincen/wwd/mission.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2009) (declaring FinCEN’s 
mission as “[s]upporting law enforcement, intelligence, and regulatory agen-
cies through sharing and analysis of financial intelligence”). 
 179. See FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2009, at 4 (2009), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/ 
annual_report_fy2009.pdf (indicating that approximately 16.7 million BSA-
required reports were filed in fiscal year 2009). 
 180. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2), (c) (2006). 
 181. There have been some efforts to develop a safe harbor, or “white list,” 
of safe transactions and transactors. Cf. Robert E. O’Leary, Improving the Ter-
rorist Finance Sanctions Process, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 549, 583–84 
(2010) (discussing Treasury white lists and charities).  
 182. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(Z) (2006) (allowing for regulation of “any other 
business designated by the [Treasury] Secretary whose cash transactions have 
a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters”).  
 183. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 443–45 (2005) (describing a notice-and-comment process 
for feedback and development as opposed to public hearings or legislative in-
volvement).  
 184. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2006) (outlining the requirements for report-
ing suspicious transactions). 
 185. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (outlining the requirements for an institution’s 
anti-money laundering program); see also Lester Joseph, Anti-Money Launder-
  
2010] ADMINISTRATION BY TREASURY 223 
 
and, in the case of banks, complying with “know your customer” 
regulations.186 Compliance with all of these regulations is ex-
pensive.187 Covered entities often hire consultants, who use 
software systems to track transactions, offer outside training 
sessions, and advise financial institutions as to what they must 
do to meet the Department’s standards.188 Treasury has im-
posed large fines on financial institutions that fail to meet their 
FinCEN reporting requirements, and the large number of insti-
tutions subject to penalties suggests that compliance is by no 
means easy.189 
 
ing Update, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WORKSHOP 2003, at 627, 
633 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. B-1378, 2003) (pro-
viding further description of the anti-money laundering requirements). 
 186. See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l) (requiring financial institutions to make efforts 
to verify new customers, maintain records of the information used for verifica-
tion, and consult terrorist lists); Jeffrey P. Taft & Christina A. LaVera, The 
Changing Landscape of Federal Money Laundering Laws: An Overview of the 
USA PATRIOT ACT and Related Developments, 57 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 
109, 111–12 (2003) (providing more information on Customer Identification 
Verification). In addition to the previously described regulations, financial in-
stitutions are required to file Currency Transaction Reports, which include 
reports on “coins and currency received in a nonfinancial trade or business.” 
William J. Sweet, Jr. et al., Summary of the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 Anti-
Money Laundering Provisions, in NEW RESPONSIBILITIES & OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER THE MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT & FINANCIAL ANTI-TERRORISM 
ACT OF 2001, at 55, 68 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 
Number B-1289, 2002). Further, FinCEN increased regulation on insurance 
companies by requiring them to implement anti-money laundering programs 
and file Suspicious Activity Reports. Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enforcement 
Network, Insurance Companies Required to Establish Anti-Money Laundering 
Programs and File Suspicious Activity Reports (Oct. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.fincen.gov/newsrelease10312005.pdf. 
 187. See Karen E. Hoffman, AML Security Emphasis Detection and Preven-
tion, BANKING STRATEGIES, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 54, 56 (indicating that in both 
2003 and 2004 banks spent $125 million a year on FinCEN regulatory com-
pliance); Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 1413 (noting that the money-
laundering laws may have total costs around $7 billion). 
 188. See Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 1406–07 (discussing the role of 
consultants). 
 189. See, e.g., In re Wachovia Bank, No. 2010-1, FinCEN Assessment of 
Civil Money Penalty (Mar. 12, 2010), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_ 
room/ea/files/100316095447.pdf (assessing a $110 million fine); In re Doha 
Bank, No. 2009-1, FinCEN Assessment of Civil Money Penalty (Apr. 20, 2009), 
available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/Doha.pdf (assessing a 
$5 million fine); In re United Bank of Africa, No. 2008-3, FinCEN Assessment 
of Civil Money Penalty (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/ 
news_room/ea/files/UBAAssessment.pdf (assessing a $15 million fine); In re El 
Noa Noa Corp., No. 2008-2, FinCEN Assessment of Civil Money Penalty (Apr. 
14, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/ElNoaNoa.pdf 
(assessing a $12,000 fine); In re Sigue Corp. & Sigue, LLC, No. 2008-1, Fin-
CEN Assessment of Civil Money Penalty (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http:// 
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c. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
Treasury’s new focus on national security is not restricted 
to FinCEN and OFAC. As the head of CFIUS, Treasury works 
with a number of national security- and international com-
merce-related departments to supervise foreign acquisitions of 
American assets.190 Treasury occasionally regulates as a mem-
ber of interagency committees in the executive branch in other 
ways as well,191 but CFIUS may be its most notable (and there-
fore exemplary) institution. These committees enjoy plenty of 
discretion, are not subject to judicial review, and, because they 
do not themselves promulgate rules, are not subject to OMB 
oversight.192 But, as we will see, the legislature can provide a 
great deal of oversight in this area and does in the case of 
CFIUS. Indeed, generally speaking, it is the prospect of better 
legislative oversight that might provide the most relief to good 
governance worriers when confronted with the discretion the 
Department now enjoys. 
CFIUS is perhaps the Treasury outfit most on the minds of 
Wall Street investment bankers and Washington deal lawyers, 
for it can impose the death penalty on deals that involve foreign 
acquirers.193 The justification for CFIUS’s role is that the gov-
ernment should be able to nix assets acquisitions that would 
threaten U.S. security. It monitors, for example, the purchasing 
of property near sensitive military bases and recently rejected a 
 
www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/files/sigue_assement_final.pdf (assessing a $12 
million fine). A list of other enforcement actions are available on FinCEN’s 
website. Enforcement Actions, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http:// 
www.fincen.gov/news_room/ea/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). 
 190. See Zaring, supra note 40, at 83 (describing the role of CFIUS); Office 
of Investment Security: Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS), U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www.treas.gov/offices/ 
international-affairs/cfius/members.shtml (last updated Feb. 19, 2009) (identi-
fying the members of CFIUS and offices that participate in CFIUS’s activities). 
 191. In addition to CFIUS, Treasury is a member of other interagency 
committees. E.g., Federal Interagency Committee on Indoor Air Quality, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/iaq/ciaq/index.html#CIAQ_ 
Members (last visited Oct. 22, 2010); About the Interagency Coordinating 
Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/files/committees/ 
editorial_0592.shtm (last modified Oct. 6, 2008). 
 192. See Jennifer Cooke, Finding the Right Balance of Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Regulation: Open Investment vs. National Security, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 728, 772 (asserting a complete absence of judicial review of CFIUS); Zar-
ing, supra note 40, at 98 (“CFIUS’s evolving legal authority is a story about 
substantive flexibility . . . .”). 
 193. See Zaring, supra note 40, at 107 n.111 (describing the oft threatened 
use of a blocked transaction). 
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proposed acquisition of a gold mine by a Chinese firm that ven-
tured too close to a U.S. air force base in Nevada.194  
Like Treasury’s other security-focused pursuits, however, 
CFIUS does not follow traditional administrative procedure. 
Although OFAC and FinCEN are subject to some judicial re-
view, CFIUS operates secretly and is not subject to judicial re-
view of any sort.195 If OFAC illustrates a rights problem of civil 
tools being repurposed for law enforcement, and FinCEN is an 
example of how this uneasy repurposing can burden regulated 
industry, CFIUS represents a different kind of law enforce-
ment; it is law enforcement as a congressional notification ser-
vice. That is, rather than rejecting many foreign transactions in 
its own right, it keeps Congress apprised of potential acquisi-
tions, which in turn prompts the legislature to raise a fuss 
when it deems any particular acquisition to be problematic.196 
This role is more evident from the Committee’s practice than 
its mandate.  
Like that of many of Treasury’s enterprises, CFIUS’s legal 
authority is replete with discretion.197 For example, the Com-
mittee is charged with reviewing proposed foreign acquisitions 
to determine whether they will impair “national security,” a 
term “interpreted broadly and without regard for particular in-
dustries,” its scope lying entirely “within the President’s discre-
tion.”198 Thus, even if CFIUS were subject to judicial review, 
there would likely be no law to apply that would render re-
viewable CFIUS’s interpretations of its broad jurisdictional 
mandate.199 How would a court review an agency’s interpreta-
 
 194. Eric Lipton, Chinese Withdraw Offer for Nevada Gold Concern, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at B3, available at 2009 WLNR 25712705. 
 195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 196. See generally Zaring, supra note 40. 
 197. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (describing the lack of judi-
cial review over CFIUS). 
 198. David Zaring, What Exactly Can Foreign Sovereigns Purchase in 
America?, THE CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.theconglomerate 
.org/2008/04/what-exactly-ca.html; see also Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,702, 70,705 
(Nov. 21, 2008) (stating that the Committee will address national security con-
cerns raised by “particular transaction[s],” “rather than identifying certain 
sectors in which foreign investment is prohibited, restricted, or discouraged”); 
Zaring, supra note 40, at 84. 
 199. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (concluding that, as 
a statutory matter, employment decisions by the director of the CIA are not 
subject to judicial review, and suggesting that employment in a national secu-
rity agency is essentially unreviewable). Still, the question of how Webster’s 
statutory national security exemption applies in other contexts is contested. 
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tion of what constitutes “critical infrastructure” or what threat-
ens U.S. national security? This observation might lead some to 
conclude that if the United States had a vibrant nondelegation 
doctrine, CFIUS would probably violate it.200  
In a sense, the Committee’s broad remit seems to be con-
strained only by its deadlines in reviewing foreign acquisitions. 
Potential foreign acquirers submit their deals for evaluation 
over a thirty-day period, and, if CFIUS decides to investigate 
further, a subsequent forty-five day window.201 The Committee 
then sends a recommendation to the President, who either 
blocks the transaction or permits it.202 CFIUS may also recom-
mend that the President impose—in the form of “mitigation 
agreements”203—a variety of conditions on the acquiring com-
pany, such as preventing foreigners’ access to the operations of 
the target asset and guaranteeing U.S. law enforcement access 
to the firm’s resources.204 CFIUS concludes any such agree-
ments, and it seems that the great majority of them are modest 
forms of boilerplate.205 
If CFIUS is not subject to robust constraints by the courts 
or the Executive, the real locus of its restraint is the increasing 
supervision exercised by Congress. Congress has regularly ob-
jected to foreign acquisitions ever since the Committee was 
founded, to the point where some foreign acquirers consult with 
Congress before embarking on mergers.206 CFIUS itself rarely 
 
See Zaring, supra note 40, at 84 n.8 (questioning the scope of Webster). The 
terms that trigger CFIUS investigations, such as “covered transaction,” “for-
eign person,” “U.S. person,” “critical infrastructure,” and “national security,” 
are either defined broadly or left undefined. See Regulations Pertaining to 
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 21,861, 
21,861–68 (Apr. 23, 2008) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800) (providing a lengthy 
discussion of covered transactions and definitions). CFIUS’s proposed defini-
tions of these terms generally offer examples of terms but maintain flexibility 
to reach other, dissimilar matters. Id. 
 200. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political 
Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 489–507 (1985) (describing 
the U.S. delegation doctrine as “moribund” and critiquing efforts to revive it). 
 201. 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170(b) (2006). This grant of substantive power is 
increasingly common following Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984). 
 202. 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170(b)(3)(B), (d). 
 203. The agreements are so labeled because the acquirer agrees to take 
steps to “mitigate” the threat to national security. Id. § 2170(l)(1). 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Zaring, supra note 40, at 117–21 (discussing “boilerplate” agree-
ments).  
 206. See Council on Foreign Relations, Global FDI Policy: Correcting a Pro-
tectionist Drift (June 26, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.cfr.org/ 
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gets in the way of foreign acquisitions, and indeed, has nixed 
less than a handful of them since its founding in the mid-
1970s.207 Instead, its main role is to bring mergers to the atten-
tion of Congress, where given the right level of outrage, the 
transactions are more likely to be challenged, through a variety 
of committee-oriented legal and political means.208 With 
CFIUS, we see that some of Treasury’s operation is supervised 
in a different way than are other agencies, rather than not su-
pervised at all. Indeed, congressional oversight of CFIUS is 
representative of how Congress, rather than the courts, can ex-
ercise restraint over Treasury. 
d. Conclusion 
Everything Treasury does in relation to national security is 
interesting, and little of it is obviously within the traditional 
expertise of an agency whose raison d’être used to be getting 
and spending money.209 Nonetheless, as the de facto regulator 
of the financial system, Treasury’s authority over banks and 
thrifts has positioned it to play a role in antiterrorism and 
mergers and acquisitions, two of the subjects of many a news-
paper headline over the last decade.210 The Department did not 
used to do these things, but now it does, and in each of them it 
enjoys less judicial review than would criminal law enforcers, 
or, for example, domestic antitrust regulators evaluating a pro-
posed merger. In this way, the Department expanded its turf 
and moved away from the tough judicial oversight presented by 
criminal procedure, though such toughness is occasionally de-
bated,211 and from the APA.  
 
publication/16695/global_fdi_policy.html) (discussing how companies get ap-
proval from members of Congress before engaging in transactions). For more 
on Congress’s role, see Jonathan C. Stagg, Note, Scrutinizing Foreign Invest-
ment: How Much Congressional Involvement Is Too Much? 93 IOWA L. REV. 
325, 342 (2007) (“Congress has chosen to take action in several instances 
where it considered a transaction a threat to national security, even after 
CFIUS conducted an investigation and approved the deal.”). 
 207. See Yvonne C.L. Lee, The Governance of Contemporary Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 197, 209 (2010) (citing examples of for-
eign investments facing opposition from Congress despite executive approval); 
Stagg, supra note 206, at 340 n.116 (noting, for example, that in 2004 CFIUS 
only recommended blocking one out of forty-five such transactions).  
 208. See Lee, supra note 207. 
 209. OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, supra note 77, at 1. 
 210. See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted in Secret by 
U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 
WLNR 10871009. 
 211. See Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitution-
  
228 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:187 
 
Treasury’s increasingly important national security role, in 
other words, affects a great deal of daily economic operations. 
Nevertheless, Treasury enjoys a vast amount of discretion in 
overseeing those operations because of its national security 
claims. In this sense, its new remit poses not only a case study 
in how bureaucratic authority can fill the interstices of over-
sight, but also a question about the appropriate limits of unre-
viewable national security claims.212 As Treasury continues to 
grow its operations in this area, the importance of this question 
will likely grow as well.  
II.  THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TREASURY’S 
ADMINISTRATION   
If a review of Treasury’s normal operations inspired by its 
own organizational chart suggests that much of its activities 
exist outside the realm of ordinary administrative procedure, 
then we might expect Treasury to operate outside those con-
fines when it faces dramatic problems like the financial crisis. 
And Treasury’s bold steps during that crisis were, in fact, 
unique by the standards of conventional administrative law. 
But the argument here is not that Treasury’s actions during 
the crisis were unique, but rather that they were analogous to 
the way the Department ordinarily acts: namely, outside the 
realm of ordinary administrative procedure.213 
 
al Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1056 (2001) (“Criminal procedure has been 
in retrenchment from the days of the Warren Court almost continuously since 
the 1970s.”). 
 212. Of course, the extent of unreviewability on the basis of national secu-
rity and executive branch prerogative has, in other contexts, spawned a large 
legal literature and series of Supreme Court cases—as exemplified by the ex-
tensive litigation over executive detentions, extraordinary renditions, and condi-
tions of confinement for potential terrorists since 9/11. See, e.g., Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (“[The President] may not disregard 
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed 
on his powers.”). See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 941 (2008) (examining whether the President possesses inherent war 
powers that may be used against the will of Congress); Cass R. Sunstein, Clear 
Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1 (discussing the tendency of the judiciary to require clear direction 
from Congress before allowing serious executive intrusion into fundamental 
liberties); Posner & Vermuele, supra note 4 (comparing emergency governance 
during the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis). 
 213. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text (explaining how Treas-
ury rarely follows standard administrative procedures). 
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To some, Treasury’s actions looked like a department on a 
rampage.214 Other regulators of distressed financial institu-
tions, such as the SEC and FDIC, which both had a claim to 
supervising the safety and soundness of investment and other 
banks, played decidedly secondary roles during the crisis, as 
Treasury flexed its muscles and led the way, often quite dra-
matically.215  
To be sure, the crisis encapsulated what is notable about 
Treasury’s unique form of administration. It first maximized its 
authority by doing deals, rather than by regulating. Dealmak-
ing permeated even the staffing of the government’s response—
its financial crisis team was comprised largely of investment 
bankers, and led by Secretary Paulson, a veteran dealmaker 
who served as the Chief Executive Officer of Goldman Sachs.216 
None of this was reviewed by a court—as Treasury no doubt 
expected—and all of it was made without any regard for the ni-
ceties of corporate law by the states.217 
If Treasury’s initial dealmaking approach afforded it max-
imum discretion, the new programs it created to bail out, de-
stroy, or recapitalize struggling financial intermediaries were 
also subject to the aggressive interpretations that have become 
a hallmark of Treasury’s administrative procedure. Treasury’s 
bailout of the MMF industry is an instructive example of where 
the history and evolution of Treasury’s authority—again, away 
from ordinary procedure and into something unique—has tak-
en the Department. Section A considers this example. It is also 
worth assessing the successes (or lack thereof) during the fi-
nancial crisis of the ordinary protection private parties enjoy 
 
 214. See Lawson, supra note 4, at 57–58 (arguing that Congress and the 
President were out of control when they handed Treasury unprecedented emer-
gency authority).  
 215. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS 
AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 
(2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf (noting 
SEC’s role in supervising investment banks); FDIC Mission, Vision, and Values, 
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/mission/index.html (last up-
dated May 4, 2009) (discussing the FDIC’s mission of “examining and supervis-
ing financial institutions for safety and soundness and consumer protection”).  
 216. See Neil Irwin, On the Money at Treasury; Working Behind the Scenes, 
Paulson Had His Department Ready to Confront the Credit Crisis, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 20, 2007, at D01 (discussing Paulson’s Goldman Sachs background 
and Treasury’s use of dealmaking). 
 217. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 28, at 467 (explaining that Treas-
ury acted as a dealmaker whose primary focus was not on strict compliance 
with contract, securities, and corporate law). 
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against overweening government regulation: lawsuits. Section 
B evaluates the record of judicial review during this period. 
A. THE MONEY MARKET FUND BAILOUT AS A CASE STUDY 
Treasury turned itself into an on-the-fly FDIC for the MMF 
industry during the financial crisis. A description of how it did 
so illustrates Treasury’s use of discretion—in this case to both 
save and remodel an entire asset class, at a cost of billions, and 
with the stroke of a pen and a little executive branch consulta-
tion.  
The first MMF was the Reserve (later the Reserve Funds), 
developed by Bruce Bent and Henry B.R. Brown in 1970. The 
idea was to take cash and invest it in short-term securities that 
were like cash, because they were liquid (i.e., could be sold), 
constantly maturing (i.e., they returned the principal to invest-
ors shortly after they were bought), and were reasonably 
safe.218 In this way, MMFs were designed to be relatively risk-
less liquid assets, albeit with a return only slightly higher than 
holding cash.219 Catastrophe was thought to be unlikely given 
the asset classes in which MMFs would typically invest—
government securities, certificates of deposit, and asset-backed 
commercial paper.220 MMFs built a strong business on the basis 
of offering this liquid, slightly-better-than-cash product to a va-
riety of investors.221 The funds were often used by institutional 
investors for their short-term cash pool, but individual invest-
ors also invested heavily in them.222  
The funds were not exempt from regulation; they were 
deemed to be covered by the SEC’s Investment Company Act of 
1940, as implemented, specifically, by Rule 2a-7.223 That rule 
included requirements that MMFs not acquire instruments 
 
 218. Robert N. Sobol, Enhanced Cash “Yield Plus” Funds: The Treasurer’s 
New Cash Management Complement to Money Market Funds, 7 J. 
INVESTMENT COMPLIANCE 60, 60 (2006) (stating that Bruce Bent invented 
money market funds in 1970 and offered them to the public in 1971); Bruce 
Weber, Henry B.R. Brown, Who Opened Money Markets to Masses, Dies at 82, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, at B5, available at 2008 WLNR 15305678 (stating 
that Henry B.R. Brown and Bruce Bent collaborated in starting the first mon-
ey market fund, the Reserve). 
 219. See Sobol, supra note 218, at 61 (describing how MMFs are known for 
their relative stability). 
 220. Id. at 61 (noting these asset classes, their traditional safety, and the 
general willingness of funds to protect their investors’ principal). 
 221. Weber, supra note 218. 
 222. See id. (noting total MMF assets at nearly $3.6 trillion in 2008). 
 223. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010).  
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with a remaining maturity greater than 397 days; that they 
maintain a stable net asset value per share; that they not 
maintain a dollar-weighted average portfolio that exceeded nine-
ty days; that they limited investments to securities that present 
minimal risks; and that they met diversification require-
ments.224 
The problem with MMFs began in September 2008 with 
the news that the Reserve Primary fund, the progeny of the 
first fund started by Bent and Brown, had “broken the buck”; 
that is, its net asset value fell below one dollar.225 The fund 
immediately announced its winding up, and reported that cus-
tomers would only receive ninety-seven cents on each dollar 
they invested on September 16, 2008.226 The fund had moved 
out of super safe Treasury bonds and, increasingly, into com-
mercial paper and other unsecured short-term lending done by 
businesses, including Lehman Brothers, where it had, at the 
time of the bank’s failure, $785 million of short-term financing 
outstanding.227 Reserve Primary’s assets in commercial paper 
increased from one percent in July 2007 to approximately sixty 
percent in July 2008.228 Another MMF failed two days later, on 
September 18, 2008, when Putnam Investments was forced to 
liquidate its Putnam Prime Money Market fund, a $12.3 billion 
fund serving professional investors.229  
The results were close to catastrophic for the industry, as 
investors left MMFs in droves for safer asset classes. In less 
than a week, almost $170 billion of investor funds flowed out of 
 
 224. See id.; Sobol, supra note 218, at 61 (referring to these requirements). 
 225. Diana B. Henriques, Money Market Fund Warns Its Customers Face 
Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at C1, available at 2008 WLNR 17634393 
(noting the rareness of MMFs breaking the buck). The one other instance of an 
MMF breaking the buck occurred in 1994, when Community Bankers Mutual 
Fund in Denver liquidated. See Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money 
Fund Falls Below $1 a Share, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 16, 2008, http://www 
.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a5O2y1go1GRU (stating that 
Community Bankers Mutual Fund liquidated because of investments in inter-
est-rate derivatives). 
 226. Tara Siegel Bernard, Money Market Funds Enter a World of Surprising 
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008, at C13, available at 2008 WLNR 17703966. 
 227. John Waggoner, Money Market Fund Breaks a Buck, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 17, 2008, at 4B, available at 2008 WLNR 17632868.  
 228. INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 54–
55 (2009), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (describing 
how the growth in its commercial paper assets increased the Primary Fund’s 
yield, doubling its assets from $30 billion to $67 billion).  
 229. Diana B. Henriques, Professional Money Fund Is Closed by Putnam, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at C1, available at 2008 WLNR 17804319. 
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money market institutions.230 And because MMFs were the 
leading purchasers of commercial paper at a time when credit 
from any other source was largely unavailable, Treasury wor-
ried that the problems would spill over into the broader econo-
my, in which the larger businesses rely, in substantial part, on 
commercial paper to finance their working capital.231 
Treasury flexed its regulatory muscle to preserve the via-
bility of the country’s short-term debt purchasers, announcing 
on September 19 that it would insure the funds up to $50 bil-
lion.232 Its goal was to “provide[] support to investors in funds 
that participate in the program and [assure that] those funds 
will not ‘break the buck,’” in order to “alleviate investors’ con-
cerns about the ability for money market mutual funds to ab-
sorb a loss.”233 Nearly all MMFs became part of the program.234 
Treasury created and financed the program through a nov-
el use of an obscure fund on hand for international currency 
crises. It justified the program by recourse to the aging statute 
that gave Treasury the ability, in its view, to disburse those as-
sets to a domestic financial industry in trouble. Treasury rooted 
its power to insure the money market in the Gold Reserve Act 
of 1934, which created the Exchange Stabilization Fund and al-
lowed the Department to hold gold and various currencies to 
deal with shocks to the economy.235 Congress appropriated 
$2 billion to the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) in 1934 
 
 230. Diana B. Henriques, Treasury to Guarantee Money Market Funds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 17890780 (“Money funds 
held more than $3.4 trillion in investor funds, as of the most recent industry 
tally released Thursday, down almost $170 billion from the previous week.”). 
 231. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces 
Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http:// 
www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp1147.htm (describing MMFs as “a funda-
mental source of financing for our capital markets and financial institutions”). 
 232. Henriques, supra note 230 (“The Treasury Department announced 
that, at least temporarily, it would guarantee money market funds against 
losses up to $50 billion.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra 
note 231 (announcing the guaranty program and stating that the assets for 
the program will come from the Exchange Stabilization Fund that was estab-
lished by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934). 
 233. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 231; see also Da-
vidoff & Zaring, supra note 28, at 506–07 (discussing Treasury’s attempt to 
stabilize the market). 
 234. Mark Jewell, Money-Market Funds Flock to Guarantee Program, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-10-10 
-3754594472_x.htm. 
 235. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 231; Exchange 
Stabilization Fund: Introduction, U.S. DEPARTMENT TREASURY, http://www 
.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/esf/ (last updated Aug. 6, 2007).  
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and by September 30, 2009 the Fund had assets worth approx-
imately $105 billion, which Treasury used to back the money 
market industry.236 It justified the repurposing of the ESF with 
reference to Congress’s somewhat inscrutable guidance about 
the fund.237 As amended in the 1970s, the Gold Reserve Act 
provided that: 
The Department of the Treasury has a stabilization fund. . . . Consis-
tent with the obligations of the Government in the International 
Monetary Fund on orderly exchange arrangements and a stable sys-
tem of exchange rates, the Secretary, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, may deal in gold, foreign exchange, and other instruments of 
credit and securities.238 
Although funds like Reserve Primary dealt largely in dol-
lars, and the Gold Reserve Act was aimed at non-dollar deno-
minated wealth, Treasury interpreted “other instruments” to 
allow it to provide guarantees for MMFs.239 As required by the 
statute, Treasury then obtained the President’s approval for its 
interpretation.240 
In this way, Treasury made itself into a deposit insurer for 
the entire money market industry. In addition, two months af-
ter Treasury set up this insurance program, it made an agree-
ment with Reserve to purchase any government securities the 
fund was unable to sell at full value—that is, Treasury set up 
after-the-fact insurance for the creditors of the first failed 
fund.241 
 
 236. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OIG-10-027, 
AUDIT OF THE EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND’S FISCAL YEARS 2009 AND 2008 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 2, 13 (2009), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/ 
international-affairs/esf/congress_reports/ (follow “ESF Annual Report for Fis-
cal Year 2009” hyperlink). The appropriated capital was later reduced to $200 
million. Id. at 2. 
 237. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 231. 
 238. 31 U.S.C. § 5302(a)(1), (b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 239. See id. § 5302(b) (listing a series of assets that conspicuously omits 
U.S. dollars). 
 240. Id.; see also Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 28, at 507. 
 241. Diana B. Henriques, Treasury to Support a Frozen Money Fund, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at B6, available at 2008 WLNR 22234562. The agree-
ment was a condition of the insurance program. See id. (“The purchase agree-
ment was a condition that the Treasury Department imposed on the fund be-
fore accepting it into the temporary money fund insurance program. . . . If the 
fund had been insured with no strings attached, it could have simply dumped 
its remaining $6.1 billion in government securities without worrying that such 
a fire sale would cause its per-share value to fall below a dollar because the 
Treasury would have been required to cover any shortfall.”). 
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Treasury’s role in the money market industry has not been 
infinite; its guarantee expired on September 19, 2009.242 But it 
was quite a regulatory development in MMF oversight, and one 
that had little to do with the SEC, which putatively regulated 
the funds.243 Treasury’s actions were not reviewed by the 
courts, had only a weak legislative hook, and occasioned no re-
view by OMB. The MMF bailout is indicative of the way Trea-
sury dealt with the crisis and representative of the way it 
usually acts, crisis or no: without judicial review, with almost 
no legislative oversight, and with little evaluation of the budg-
etary consequences elsewhere in the executive branch. 
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
During the crisis, the role of courts in the MMF bailout 
was exemplary, rather than unique. In much of the govern-
ment’s response to the financial crisis there has been little judi-
cial review—for standing reasons, because the financial indus-
try has not tried to take Treasury to court, and because courts 
tend to avoid passing judgment on Treasury policies, to the 
point where the reticence almost looks cultural, rather than 
grounded in any particular doctrine. To be sure, it is early—
courts often intervene in structuring financial regulation very 
late in the process.244 But the passive virtues deployed by the 
courts during the crisis are not so different, as we have seen, 
from the ordinary judicial scrutiny to which the Department is 
exposed.  
Indeed, the final version of the bailout statute, the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), included a provision 
for such review,245 which must have been somewhat surprising 
 
 242. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Announces Expiration 
of Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg293.htm. 
 243. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010) (regulating MMFs under the auspices 
of the SEC). 
 244. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which created the Public Compa-
ny Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), was enacted in 2002, but the Supreme 
Court did not rule on the PCAOB’s constitutionality until 2010. See Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101–109, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006)); David Zaring, Previewing the Business Case Decisions 
Tomorrow, THE CONGLOMERATE (June 27, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate 
.org/2010/06/previewing-the-business-case-decisions-tomorrow.html (discussing 
a Supreme Court case assessing the constitutionality of the PCAOB). 
 245. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 
§ 119, 122 Stat. 3782, 3787 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5229 (2006)). 
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to a department unaccustomed to it.246 But Congress’s insis-
tence on some judicial review did not, in the end, result in 
much actual supervision.247 Seemingly blockbuster litigation 
soon fizzled: Citigroup pursued some relatively halfhearted liti-
gation against Wells Fargo for slipping in a high bid, with 
Treasury’s blessing, before it could consummate its proposed 
merger with Wachovia.248 But that litigation went nowhere.249  
There was also a colorable, if politically tinged, claim 
against the auto bailout: some dissident debtholders of Chrys-
ler unsuccessfully argued that the Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) should not be used for auto manufacturers.250 But 
this sort of challenge was rare, and it never reached a federal 
appellate court for consideration on the merits. The rest of the 
litigation arising under the TARP was mounted by cranks and 
long shots. Pro se homeowners, for example, eyeing mortgage 
relief tried to argue that the TARP obligated the banks to re-
finance their loans.251 Pro se taxpayers brought their own crea-
 
 246. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 247. Congress provided in section 119 of the EESA that “[a]ctions by the 
Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act shall be subject to chapter 7 of 
title 5, United States Code, including that such final actions shall be held un-
lawful and set aside if found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or not in accordance with law.” Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
§ 119(a)(1). It confusingly added that “[n]o injunction or other form of equitable 
relief shall be issued against the Secretary for actions pursuant to section 101 
[the power granting section] . . . other than to remedy a violation of the Consti-
tution.” § 119(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). But because arbitrary and capricious 
review is generally thought of as equitable relief, it was never entirely clear 
what exactly Congress wanted the courts to do when reviewing an admittedly 
broad swath of Treasury’s bailout implementation actions. For more on this, 
see Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 28, at 520.  
 248. Wachovia Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(denying Citigroup’s motion for judgment on the merger and holding that 
EESA could retroactively disrupt exclusivity agreement between the parties); 
Citigroup, Inc. v. Wachovia Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (hold-
ing that the bank’s state law claims against two competitors were not com-
pletely preempted by EESA).  
 249. See Wachovia Corp., 634 F. Supp. 2d 445; Citigroup, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 
2d 485. 
 250. This claim was dismissed, somewhat bizarrely, for lack of standing. In 
re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 79, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing a claim that 
TARP could not be used to bail out an auto manufacturer). 
 251. Mangosing v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV-09-0601-PHX-FJM, 
2009 WL 1456783, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2009) (dismissing a pro se claim 
that EESA obligated a bank to renegotiate a mortgage); see also Ramirez v. 
Litton Loan Servicing LP, No. CV-09-0319-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1750617, at 
*1 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2009); Santos v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. Civ. 2:09-
02642 WBS DAD, 2009 WL 3756337, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009); Farrell v. 
United States, No. 09-209C, 2009 WL 3719211, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 30, 2009). 
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tive claims against the legality of the TARP.252 None of these 
claims went anywhere.  
So it was for Treasury even before the passage of the legis-
lation. Before the TARP, some Bear Stearns shareholders pur-
sued state court litigation against Bear Stearns itself for the 
way that it accepted its Treasury-urged, but very low-priced, 
sale.253 State courts in New York and Delaware resisted efforts 
to get them to deploy basic principles of corporate governance 
to police the mergers encouraged by the Department.254 
On the one hand, it was never obvious that Treasury would 
be subjected to serious litigation over its response to the finan-
cial crisis. The standing problems were always difficult, and the 
industry was reticent to stand on every jot and tittle of its 
rights as the government bailed it out. On the other hand, how-
ever, the statutes did provide for judicial review. Treasury does 
not deal with judicial review often, and if anything, the judicial 
participation in the government’s response to the crisis exempli-
fies just how far the agency has gotten away from judicially en-
forced administrative law.  
III.  THREE VERSIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW   
This Article has analyzed Treasury’s existence outside the 
usual ambit of administrative procedure and the process where-
by it came to occupy this unique position. The implication is not 
necessarily that Treasury is a rogue agency, but rather that it 
is a different one. A central point is that administrative law 
conventionally understood misses a great swath of actual ad-
ministration, in addition to what lawyers do to affect it.255 
Treasury has a great deal of flexibility, and this Article so far 
 
 252. See Murray v. Geithner, 624 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (per-
mitting a taxpayer claim that the bailout of AIG, which has Sharia compliant 
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N.Y.S.2d 709 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008). 
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tion’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2006).  
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has documented its flexibility in some detail. The implication 
drawn here, however, is not that the Department is lawless. 
Rather, it is better understood as regulated in a different, less 
onerous, way than other agencies.  
Still, Treasury has managed its political oversight, both 
within the executive branch, and in Congress, quite spectacu-
larly. Treasury has managed to develop a unique claim to ex-
pertise, especially when it is acting ministerially to implement 
the budget, and, to a degree, to administer tax policy. But 
Treasury has managed to avoid a great deal of active congres-
sional oversight because of its colorable claim of expertise in 
the areas of national security and international affairs. In what 
follows, I show how what Treasury has done, though in many 
ways unique, offers insight into a more complete picture of ad-
ministrative law. The conclusion then offers a modest prescrip-
tion for increased supervision of Treasury without undermining 
its unique approach to administration. 
Although most administrative law syllabi and scholars fo-
cus on one administrative law regime, it might be better to con-
ceive of three types of regimes that prevail in the United 
States, with Treasury exemplifying one of them. The best-
known is that supervised by the courts and subject to the rules 
of the APA. The EPA and SEC, with their consumer-protection-
oriented missions, are examples of such agencies. These agen-
cies have an adversarial relationship with regulated industry, 
and they often face challenges from active and energetic con-
sumer advocates or other nongovernmental organizations.256 
Litigation is common, so the context of these agencies’ rules 
will ultimately depend on judicial decisionmaking. 
The second type of administrative law regime is a more 
coordinated model—that is, coordinated with the stakeholders 
involved in the agencies’ remit. This might be called a constitu-
ency, or interest group representation approach.257 The De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the 
federal government’s welfare administration may be examples 
of this model, where states and cities, as well as interest 
groups, participate in the policymaking and funding decisions 
 
 256. See, e.g, NetCoalition v. SEC, Nos. 09-1042, 09-1045, 2010 WL 
3063632 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (petitioning for review of an SEC order); Our Child-
ren’s Earth Found. v. EPA, 527 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2008) (alleging that the 
EPA has failed to comply with the Clean Water Act). 
 257. Zaring & Baylis, supra note 149, at 1372 n.48 (describing the “interest 
representation” model). 
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of the agencies quite informally, or through a procurement 
process that rarely sees the light of judicial day.258 Sometimes 
agencies that pursue their bureaucratic missions this way do so 
through contracts between the government and private parties 
that are designed to pursue public ends through private 
means.259 Sometimes, these agencies make policy through con-
ditions imposed on the block grants provided states, localities, 
or other clients.260 And sometimes the government will avoid 
APA requirements through guidance, best practices, and pub-
lic-private partnerships, where administrative oversight is en-
tirely lacking, and agency policy is effectuated through contract 
and advice.261  
Finally, the Treasury model avoids the constraints of ad-
ministrative law by either taking advantage of its exemptions, 
or by ignoring the traditional administrative structure alto-
gether. The Treasury model of administrative law is interesting 
in its own right, but the Department’s idiosyncrasies should not 
hide the fact that it is, in fact, a different approach to adminis-
tration that is not completely unique. There are other agencies 
like Treasury, agencies that play important roles in the gov-
ernment without playing important roles in the judicial (or 
OMB) administration of the executive branch and administra-
tive state. These departments include the pre-APA agencies, 
and those whose regulatory mission does not comfortably fit in 
a model of consumer protection or interest group representa-
tion. The most notable of these agencies are the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense.  
The Department of State operates largely outside of judi-
cial supervision, mostly because of the well-known deference to 
 
 258. See Barbara L. Bezdeck, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and 
Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work 
Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1559 (2001) (discussing the movement of 
welfare policy to the state and local levels); Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact As-
sessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing Regulation While Localism 
Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 484 (2003) (discussing the role of local housing 
movements in influencing HUD policy). 
 259. Wendy Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization and Power: Reconfiguring 
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 277 
(2009) (noting that contracting out is a growing trend in welfare administration). 
 260. See, e.g., Bezdeck, supra note 258, at 1559 (discussing the use of block 
grants in welfare administration). 
 261. See generally Dominique Custos & John Reitz, Public-Private Partner-
ships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (Supp. 2010) (discussing public-private partner-
ships, the contracting out of government functions, and the lack of oversight). 
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the executive in foreign affairs.262 The State Department is an 
agency that makes policy without following notice-and-
comment procedures, and that, at least for its most important 
policies, need not worry about judicial review.263  
The Department of Defense, like Treasury, also antedates 
some of the technical aspects of the APA.264 It too has a foreign 
affairs and national security function that insulates much of 
what it does from judicial review.265 And Defense’s enormous 
procurement role has necessitated the development of a unique 
 
 262. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
(1936) (explaining that the “President is the sole organ of the nation in its ex-
ternal relations” (citation omitted)); see also Charles A. Lofgren, United States 
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1, 3–6 (1973) (discussing Curtiss-Wright and its role with respect to for-
eign affairs).  
 263. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2006) (exempting foreign affairs activities 
from notice-and-comment procedures). The DOJ—the other classic old-line 
agency in addition to Defense—is a somewhat different case, though as much 
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criminal, rather than administrative, procedure. See The Federal Courts and 
the Other Branches of Government: How Does the Executive Branch Interact 
with the Federal Courts?, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts 
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ministrative procedure; its extraordinary role in administrative procedure lies 
in its performance supervision over those agencies subject to judicial review 
because of the role it plays in representing those agencies in that review. See 
Appellate Staff, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/civil/appellate 
.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). It does not do so for every agency; some have 
their own appellate review staffs, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Committee and EPA. See Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 253–59, 287 (1996). De-
partment of Justice lawyers cannot be fired and therefore can exercise a great 
deal of discretion over the positions and policies of their clients, the agencies 
that they represent. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Immigration Law 2006, 55 
CATH. U. L. REV. 905, 913 (2006) (explaining that, in the immigration context, 
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 264. The Department of War, which later became the Department of De-
fense, has existed since the creation of the country. GIDDENS-WHITE, supra 
note 35, at 13. 
 265. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Hoffmann, 427 F. Supp. 1048, 1079 (N.D. 
Ala. 1976) (explaining that judicial review of “military matters and national 
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form of judicial process in which such cases rarely find their 
way to the D.C. Circuit, although other courts, notably the Fed-
eral Circuit and Court of Federal Claims, play a role in what it 
purchases and the policy it makes through that process.266  
Treasury is, in short, not the only exceptional agency in the 
government when it comes to policymaking. Pre-APA agencies 
and principles-based regulators may look rather similar to the 
Agency, and be subject to similar sorts of constraints. Other 
agencies with exceptionalist operations will be in the same 
boat. To be sure, Treasury also operates outside of the ordinary 
province of administrative law because of its own unique pedi-
gree, seniority, and mission. But while unique, it is not alone.  
As a descriptive matter, we may also observe that agencies’ 
approaches to administration are not stable. Other agencies 
will on occasion try to move away from the traditional model 
and toward the Treasury model.267 These agencies may turn 
away from rules and toward guidance of the sort Treasury em-
ploys in its banking regulatory bureaus. Agencies moving to-
ward the Treasury model will also have to determine if they 
can meet their regulatory missions using international agree-
ments or domestic funding. Notably, Treasury’s ability to find 
domestic resources is matched only by the Federal Reserve.268 
Furthermore, such agencies may look to build on the national 
security nature of their missions, which might be accomplished 
 
 266. See, e.g., Rothe Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 262 F.3d 1306 
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(D.C. Cir. 2010); Compania de Salvadorena de Cafe v. Commodities Futures 
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by expansive use of the counterterrorism policies that all agen-
cies have been granted in the wake of 9/11.  
  CONCLUSION   
I conclude with a modest prescription: more vigorous legis-
lative, rather than judicial, supervision of Treasury. The nor-
mative takeaway of this Article is that it is not clear that Treas-
ury’s administrative law should be feared, though it must be 
understood. Its flexibility avoids some of the basic problems 
that exist with administrative law, including, for example, the 
ossification threatened by an increasingly elaborate rulemak-
ing process.269 It is not subject to the onerous aspects of judicial 
review that, for example, deterred the National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration from efficiently meeting its mandate 
to ensure auto safety in the 1970s.270 Indeed, APA-style proce-
dures are not models of scientific efficiency, as George Shep-
herd has observed, and Treasury’s avoidance of them may not 
always be a bad thing.271 
Most fundamentally, if a regime is designed to give bu-
reaucrats flexibility and hold them accountable for their re-
sults—a management technique taught in many business 
schools, and a practice allegedly used often during the last ad-
ministration—then Treasury’s administrative model might 
seem to be an exemplar rather than a problem. After all, Treas-
ury has the flexibility to deploy a variety of different approach-
 
 269. Ossification is often thought to be a function of the Vermont Yankee 
decision, which meant that rulemaking procedures alone would be the basis 
for judicial review; the possibly predictable effect was that such procedures 
ballooned in size and scope. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (limiting judicial review of rule-
makings to the rulemaking record); Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont 
Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 124, 126 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (describ-
ing the growth of rulemaking records).  
 270. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO 
SAFETY 103–04 (1990) (describing the malign influence of the courts in slowing 
an agency from enacting appropriate auto safety regulations). 
 271. As Shepherd explained regarding the enactment of the APA:  
The APA was an important and clear example of an attempt to influ-
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es towards meeting its goals, and it is held accountable for its 
performance. This sort of independence is problematic when 
civil liberties are at stake. But with other regulatory missions, 
it is an organizational approach with a lengthy private-sector 
pedigree. 
Moreover, it may be desirable to have a number of different 
approaches to administration available. It may be theoretically 
advantageous, for example, to compare regulatory regimes (al-
though holding constant the differences between agencies in 
making governance comparisons is exceedingly difficult). As 
Mashaw has said, “[t]his idea of a quasi-independent, but in-
ternally responsible, administrative bureaucracy continues to 
have attraction for those who are skeptical of the efficacy of gov-
ernmental accountability through either judicial review or the 
polarized politics of electoral institutions.”272 Furthermore, it 
would be possible to overemphasize the lack of constraint on 
the institution. Treasury is subject to the organizational con-
straints facing any bureaucracy, and is confronted by a well-
organized bar that can agitate, press for consistency, and try to 
blow the whistle on bureaucratic excess, even when the pros-
pect of litigation or congressional outrage is uncertain.273 And 
Treasury has always been subject to closer oversight by the 
President, at least in theory.274 
Finally, Congress itself can play an important role in su-
pervising those areas of the government where courts and liti-
gators fear to tread. As we know, and as this Article has noted, 
it already does so to some degree through the appropriations 
process. We have seen that the supervision is extremely close 
for Treasury outfits like CFIUS. Moreover, Congress has had a 
 
 272. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and 
Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 
1739 (2007). 
 273. See, e.g., David Broder, Permanent Government, Intractable Problems, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1992, at C7 (discussing the difficulties faced by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services in making positive changes within 
congressional limitations on appropriations).  
 274. See generally Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245 (2001) (describing the growth of presidential oversight and influ-
ence over agency decisionmaking). This Article should serve as a counterpoint 
to Kagan’s, because the President, despite purportedly occupying a central role 
in agency oversight, actually does not play such a strict supervisory role over 
Treasury—and certainly did not during the financial crisis. 
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committee designed to oversee Treasury since 1816,275 and has 
long required specific accounting by the Department.276 Indeed, 
Treasury itself developed an internal administrative process to 
ensure compliance with congressional instruction.277 Through-
out its history, moreover, blue-ribbon committees have been 
convened at Congress’s request for various supervisory duties 
on an as-needed basis.278  
And it is the limitations of congressional supervision, ra-
ther than the depredations of it, that, if anything, are the as-
pects of administration by Treasury most in need of change. 
Treasury is not a perfect agency, and Congress has hardly su-
pervised it perfectly for its own part. But on occasion, it can 
make its policy preferences known—as it has, for example, 
through the Agency’s CFIUS process. Treasury is, above all, an 
alternative form of government regulation. As such, alternative 
oversight by Congress, which could preserve the uniqueness of 
the Department’s approach to regulation, might be the best 
way to treat this most powerful and most often misunderstood 
engine of government supervision of the economy. 
 
 275. See Mashaw, supra note 272, at 1724 (“By 1816 the House had estab-
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 276. Id. at 1720.  
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 278. Moreover, this is a form of supervision with historical pedigree. Treas-
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the Chief Justice, the Treasury Secretary, the Secretary of State, and the At-
torney General all inspected coinage of the mint. Mashaw, supra note 34, at 
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